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DECONSTRUCTING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW
forthcoming in FLA. L. REV. (2023)
Rachel Arnow-Richman and J.H.Verkerke*
Abstract
Employment contract law is an antiquated, ill-fitting, incoherent
mess. But no one seems inclined to fix this problem. Employment law
scholars, skeptical of employees’ ability to bargain, tend to disregard
contract law and advocate for just-cause and other legislative reform. And
contracts scholars largely ignore employment cases—viewing them, with
some justification, as part of a peculiar, specialized body of law wholly
divorced from general contract jurisprudence. As a result of this
undesirable employment law exceptionalism, courts lack the tools they
need to resolve recurring, real-world disputes.
This article offers a new, comprehensive historical account that
exposes the formalistic and anti-contractual origins of existing doctrine
and shows how to repair the harm. Blinkered by the powerful
employment-at-will presumption, judges seized on unilateral contract
theory to enforce employer promises of deferred benefits and job security.
But this narrow doctrine ignores the complexity of the employment
relationship and permits only piecemeal analysis of individual terms. The
result is rigid (and frequently inaccurate) judicial reasoning that obscures
courts’ underlying policy choices and produces technical opinions largely
detached from real life. Meanwhile, creative judicial efforts to develop an
informal alternative, which would sidestep these doctrinal challenges by
enforcing employees’ legitimate expectations, have failed to take root.
We conclude by identifying a path forward. The problems with
existing doctrine flow principally from courts’ failure to respect the
contractual character of employment and their disregard of widely
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accepted developments in contract doctrine and theory. Employment is a
long-term, fluid relationship governed by an agreement that is necessarily
incomplete, usually expressed in indefinite terms, and constantly evolving.
To address these challenges, we briefly outline a new model of a
“hyper-relational” bilateral contract. This approach reframes the dynamic
features of employment agreements in contemporary terms as a form of
contractually conferred discretion. We explain how the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing and modern approaches to contextual evidence
could resolve indefiniteness, supply missing terms, and accommodate
modification. This new model would both supply the formal framework
that courts demand and build employment contract law on a firm doctrinal
foundation at last.
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INTRODUCTION
Employment contract law is an antiquated, ill-fitting, incoherent
mess. Consider courts’ shifting rationales for enforcing employer policies
containing assurances of job security. Early employee handbook cases, for
example, invoked a wide variety of inconsistent doctrinal theories—
including unilateral contract, promissory estoppel, third-party beneficiary,
bilateral contract, and an informal approach based on “legitimate
expectations.” 1 Even as decisions eventually coalesced to favor the
unilateral contract theory, judges disagreed sharply over how that doctrine
might constrain employers who wished to modify their preexisting job
security policies. 2 Most confounding of all, subsequent rulings have
enforced employers’ broad disclaimers and confirmations of at-will status
and thus profoundly undermined any worker protection that earlier
employee handbook cases provided. 3 These disparate and shifting
decisions begin to show how courts have struggled to articulate a
consistent account of employment contract formation, modification, and
enforcement.4
Of course, we might choose to excuse this inconsistency if it enabled
judges to select an appropriate doctrinal theory to fit each distinctive fact
pattern. But technical and practical problems afflict all these approaches
and make them ill-suited to regulate employment relations. 5 To form a
unilateral contract, for example, a promisee must be aware of the
promisor’s offer and tender performance in exchange for the promised
consideration.6 However, most workers pay little attention to the details of
their employers’ onboarding documents, which are often presented after
the start of employment. 7 Similarly, promissory estoppel doctrine only

1
See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257, 1266-68 (N.J. 1985) (unilateral
contract, promissory estoppel, and third-party beneficiary doctrine); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891-92 (Mich. 1980) (bilateral contract and
legitimate expectations).
2
Compare Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1987); Asmus v.
Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (2000) with Demasse v. ITT, 984 P.2d at 1138 (AZ 1999).
3
See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
4
We document these and other inconsistencies in Parts I & III infra.
5
See infra Section I.C & Part II.
6
See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:17 (4th ed. 2022). For detailed discussion of
unilateral contracts, see infra Section II.A.
7
See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 3
(2013) (criticizing the modern tendency to enforce unread click-wrap and browse-wrap
contract terms); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and
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warrants enforcement when a promisee has detrimentally relied on the
promise.8 But few, if any, employees can produce evidence of substantial
detrimental reliance. 9 Leading cases have papered over these
shortcomings by adopting legal fictions—presumed knowledge or
reliance—to establish the essential elements of unilateral contract and
promissory estoppel doctrine.10 And these prominent cases have spawned
hundreds of similar decisions throughout the country.
Unilateral contract theory now dominates judicial analysis of most
employment agreements.11 But this doctrine is best adapted to enforcing
discrete promises—such as a reward for returning a lost pet or a prize for
winning a competition—when it makes no sense to expect the promisee to
make a return promise.12 In contrast, an employment contract ordinarily is
formed by an exchange of mutual promises and contemplates an ongoing
relationship for an indefinite period. Such a contract provides, at best, a
vague and incomplete specification of the employee’s job duties and
prospects for advancement. 13 Thus, unilateral contract doctrine is an
extremely poor tool to guide courts’ analysis of employment agreements.
But no one seems inclined to fix these problems. Countless
employment law scholars have condemned the longstanding presumption
that when employment is for an indefinite term either party may terminate
at will. 14 Some have also assailed the array of extraneous doctrines—
including mutuality and additional consideration—that many restrictive
courts deployed to transform employment-at-will from a default (and thus

the Rule of Law 12-14 (2013) (arguing that boilerplate terms go unread and that this fact
vitiates consumer consent to those terms); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and
Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, (2015).
8
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.
9
See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw Hill, 443 N.E.2d 441, 460-67 (N.Y. 1982).
10
See, e.g., Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d 880, (introducing the idea of presumed reliance);
Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257, (drawing inspiration from Toussaint and using the same legal
fiction).
11
See infra Section I.C & Part II.
12
See 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:30 (4th ed. 2022). For more detailed discussion
of unilateral contracts, see infra text at footnotes ___-___.
13
See infra Section II.B.
14
See. e.g., PAUL L. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990); see generally J. H. Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on
Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 837. One scholar estimates that there have been over two hundred articles advocating
for a just cause alternative to employment at will. See Robert Bird, Rethinking Wrongful
Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 & n.1 (2004).
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rebuttable) presumption into something more akin to a mandatory rule.15
However, employment scholars have typically advocated—with little
success16 —for just-cause legislation and other statutory reform.17 From
their perspective, contract law is an inherently limited tool because
employers have the power to unilaterally dictate and draft the terms of the
relationship.18
And contracts scholars have been no more likely to propose
meaningful corrective measures. Instead, they deride the reasoning of
employment cases or ignore them altogether. Assessing leading decisions
that enforced employee handbook policies as implied contracts, one
prominent contracts scholar quipped that the courts’ analysis “would
probably garner a first-year Contracts student an F for saying that a
contract was formed at all.”19 Other commentators have expressed more
forceful criticism of modern reliance on unilateral contract doctrine,20 but
few have devoted attention to the employment context. 21 Thus, the

15

See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
1082, 1097-99 (1984); see also infra Section I.A (surveying these and other related
doctrines).
16
See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment
Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361, 370 (1994). (acknowledging the tepid state
response to the Uniform Law Commission’s model just cause legislation). Only one state,
Montana, has modified the default rule by statute, see Montana Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2009). Recently, however, a few
localities have enacted just cause laws limited to specific industries. See N.Y. Admin. Code
§ 20-1272 (fast food workers); Phila. Code. § 9-4702 (parking lot attendants).These narrow
exceptions arguably prove the rule.
17
One example of recent success has been in the area of fair scheduling laws. See e.g.,
Stabilizing Low-Wage Work: Legal Remedies for Unpredictable Work Hours & Income
Stability (with Charlotte Alexander & Dr. Anna Haley-Lock), 50 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV.
1 (2015).
18
See, e.g., Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment
Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345 (2008). A few scholars have suggested that
relational contract theory could support a more employment-appropriate contractual
framework. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 Penn. J. Bus.
L. 149 (2005); Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange,
46 Buff. L. Rev. 763 (1998).
19
Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 345 (1986).
20
See, e.g., Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The
Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85 (2010)
(critiquing reliance on unilateral contract theory in the insurance context).
21
See, e.g., David G. Epstein & Yvette Joy Liebesman, Bearded Ladies Walking on
the Brooklyn Bridge, 59 ARK. L. REV. 267 (2006); Mark Pettit, Modern Unilateral
Contracts, 63 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 551 (1983).
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prevailing attitude among contracts scholars has been to dismiss these
cases as part of a peculiar, specialized body of law wholly divorced from
general contract jurisprudence.22
The result, we argue, is an undesirable “employment law
exceptionalism.” Employment contract law persists as an isolated,
doctrinally aberrant body of law that leaves courts without the tools they
need to resolve recurring, real world disputes. In this Article, we
deconstruct 23 employment contract doctrine and lay the foundation
necessary to reconstruct the law on a firmer foundation. We offer a new,
critical, historical account that exposes the formalistic and anti-contractual
roots of existing doctrine and reveals what we need to do to repair the harm
this approach has caused. Our principal project here is to clear away the
confused wreckage of current law. By doing so, we argue it will be
possible to redeploy contract law within the bounds of accepted
employment law.
We ask first how courts managed to get so much so wrong. Our story
begins with the employment-at-will presumption itself. Until roughly
1980, courts were overtly hostile to almost all contract claims for
protection against discharge without cause. They established a nearly
irrebuttable presumption that any indefinite hiring was terminable at will.24
Only extraordinary circumstances—such as an employee who sold a
competing business or surrendered a workplace injury claim—might
sometimes overcome this “super-presumption.”25 Even express contracts
for “permanent” or “lifetime” employment were routinely held to imply
instead an impermanent at-will relationship.26 Recurring doctrinal errors—
such as requiring additional consideration or interpreting mutuality as a

22
See, e.g., Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on
the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33 (2003).
23
Note that we use the verb “deconstruct” here in its colloquial sense of untangling,
dismantling, and scrutinizing. Our project does not draw on the practice of radical
“deconstruction” popularized by Jacques Derrida and others. See generally GREGORY
JONES-KATZ, DECONSTRUCTION: AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION (University of Chicago Press,
2021).
24
See J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: Finding a Way to
Enforce Employee Handbook Promises at 23 in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES (Samuel
Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007).
25
See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper, 266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936) (refusing to find
contract for job security without additional consideration or an agreement to work for a
definite term of years); see also infra Section I.A.
26
Id. (construing “permanent” employment to be for an indefinite term and therefore
terminable at will).
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mandate for symmetrical obligations—allowed employers to escape
enforcement even when they expressly offered their employees definitive
assurances of job security.27
By contrast, however, courts took a more permissive approach to
cases involving benefits and compensation. 28 Beginning in the early
twentieth century, courts began to enforce employers’ promises of
deferred benefits such as pensions or severance pay. Even though these
promises were embedded in an ongoing employment relationship, judges
enforced them as independent unilateral contracts.29 We argue that courts
were drawn to this approach because it allowed them to enforce these
discrete promises without disrupting the at-will nature of the overall
employment relationship. Moreover, unilateral contract doctrine provided
at least a superficially plausible framework for deferred benefit cases.
Courts confronted a promise to pay a sum of money on the occurrence of
a specific event—a situation that roughly resembles offering a prize or
reward for some performance.
But judicial reasoning sometimes has unintended consequences. The
deferred benefits rulings subsequently inspired courts to enforce handbook
promises and other assurances of job security.30 With that inspiration came
a doctrinal legacy. In a development that has gone largely unremarked by
scholars, most of the subsequent cases eventually adopted the same
unilateral contract model applied in those deferred benefits precedents.31
But fundamental features of the typical employment relationship contrast
sharply with the “reward paradigm” of unilateral contract doctrine.
Applying the unilateral approach to these complex, relational agreements
inevitably makes judicial decisions formalistic and detached from the realworld relationships they purport to regulate. Moreover, courts’ use of legal
fictions to establish essential elements of a bargain further distances their
formal doctrinal analysis from key facts about employment contracts.
Reading employment contract opinions rarely illuminates the parties’
relationship. Instead, judicial reasoning obscures important policy choices
and rests on ill-conceived applications of archaic contract law.32

27

See Summers, Contract of Employment, supra note 15.
But see Verkerke, Story of Woolley, supra note 20, at 29-30; see also infra
Section I.B.
29
See Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Pwr., 143 A.2d 762 (N.J. Super. 1958).
30
See, e.g., Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257 (relying on reasoning of Anthony).
31
See. e.g., Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257 (applying unilateral contract doctrine).
32
See infra Part II.
28
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The law of employee handbook enforcement illustrates just how
poorly prevailing doctrine fits fundamental characteristics of the
employment relationship. A unilateral contract is formed only when the
offeree completes performance, and prior to that time, the offeree has no
legal obligations to the offeror. 33 But most employment contracts are
formed prior to any performance, when a worker accepts a written or oral
job offer, and those contracts include many mutual legal obligations. An
offer of a unilateral contract also typically contemplates a precisely
defined performance with no expectation of continued interaction between
the parties.34 In contrast, employers and employees anticipate a working
relationship that will continue for an indefinite period, and both parties
recognize that the nature of their required performance will evolve over
time. It is also notable that the unilateral framework has fared no better
outside of the employment context. Prominent contracts scholars and legal
authorities appear to agree that unilateral contracts are, and should be, an
unusual exception to the bilateral rule.35 Thus, this doctrine makes little
sense as a vehicle for analyzing employment promises.
Considering all this confusion, it may be tempting to abandon formal
doctrine and rely instead on a direct appeal to public policy. However,
creative judicial efforts to develop an informal alternative approach that
enforces employees’ expectations of job security have failed to take root.
In an influential early decision concerning employee handbooks, the
Michigan Supreme Court said that an employer’s written policy would be
enforceable as an implied contract if it created “legitimate expectations”
of job security.36 We explore this intriguing, informal, alternative theory
in part because it avoids many problems that plague the unilateral contract
framework. Under this approach, plaintiffs would no longer need to
33
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:17 (4th ed. 2022). Note, however, that Restatement
Section 45 protects the reliance of an offeree who has begun to perform by holding the
offer open as an option contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45.
34
Id.
35
Karl Llewellyn, principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, condemned
doctrines such as unilateral contracts that invite “superb classroom theatrics” but “[do] not
well fit the fact-conditions” of actual business deals. Under Llewellyn’s leadership, the
UCC rejected the unilateral/bilateral terminology in favor of a rule that an offer may be
accepted in “any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.” Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-206(1). Subsequently, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts further
diminished the role of unilateral contracts by providing that “[i]n case of doubt it is
presumed that an offer invites formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance amounting
… to a promise … rather than the formation of one or more unilateral contracts by actual
performance.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 31.
36
See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d 880.
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shoehorn their claims into conventional allegations of offer and acceptance
supported by adequate consideration. Strikingly, however, the court’s
informal approach has attracted no followers. 37 Even in Michigan,
subsequent cases have curtailed the scope of protected legitimate
expectations by assessing employee claims more skeptically. And courts
in other jurisdictions appear determined to keep handbook claims (and
other employment contract cases) firmly tethered to formal contract
doctrine. The lesson we draw from this history—and states’ failure to
broadly enact just-cause protection for employees—is that the
employment at will rule and formal contract doctrine will continue to
govern employment contracts for the foreseeable future.
We conclude by identifying a path forward. We describe a new
bilateral, “hyper-relational” framework for employment contracts.
Employment is a long term, fluid, and reciprocal undertaking governed by
an agreement that is necessarily incomplete, usually expressed in
indefinite terms, and constantly evolving. The problems with existing
doctrine flow principally from courts’ failure to respect the contractual
character of this arrangement. In analogous contracting situations,
however, courts have often confronted agreements with similar features.
Many commercial contracts (1) omit important terms or specify the
parties’ obligations in indefinite terms, (2) are subject to frequent
adjustments in light of the parties’ experience performing the contract, and
(3) confer a right on one or both parties to terminate the relationship
without cause.
Contemporary commercial law has developed workable doctrinal
solutions to each of these problems. Under both the UCC and the
Restatement, open terms and indefiniteness are no longer insurmountable
obstacles to contract formation so long as the parties intend to make
binding commitments.38 Courts routinely fill contractual “gaps” and admit
contextual evidence for the purpose of interpreting or supplementing
written agreements.39 Similarly, the preexisting duty rule has largely given
way to more flexible doctrines that enforce modifications made in good
faith.40 Finally, many cases have held that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing constrains the exercise of contractually conferred discretion,

37

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
39
See id. Of course, some issues still create controversy. See generally David Charny,
The New Formalism in Contracts, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999).
40
See UCC § 2-209; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
38
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including the power to terminate an agreement at will. Under the UCC, for
instance, good faith requires parties to provide reasonable notice before an
at-will termination.41
We readily acknowledge that better ways exist to regulate
employment relationships than at-will contracts. But despite trenchant
criticisms, the rule has remained remarkably resilient. Courts regularly
invoke the presumption,42 and it recently received the imprimatur of the
first Restatement of Employment Law. 43 We therefore put to one side
debates about the merits and legitimacy of employment-at-will. Rather
than reinvigorate a futile quest for just-cause legislation,44 we advocate for
a more achievable goal. Under the doctrinal reforms we propose,
employers undoubtedly will continue to have considerable discretion to
define the nature of performance and to establish workplace policies. But
legal regulation of the employment relationship will be much more
coherent and effective once courts recognize that employment contracts
resemble bilateral, relational, commercial contracts rather than unilateral
contracts for rewards or prizes. Our new approach would supply the formal
doctrinal framework that courts so clearly demand. More importantly,
however, our solution would finally place employment contract law on a
firm conceptual foundation.
We proceed in four parts. Part I traces the doctrinal history of
employment contracts. Part II offers a rigorous critical appraisal of the
unilateral contract approach to employment contracts. We show just how
ill-suited it is to regulate the complexities of employment relations and the
problems it has engendered. Part III then explores an alternative, informal,
doctrinal path-not-taken—enforcement based on employees’ legitimate
expectations. Although this approach would alleviate many of the
shortcomings of unilateral contract doctrine, courts have shown a strong
preference for more formal theories of enforcement. Part IV therefore
concludes by offering an initial description of just such an approach. We
show that contemporary contract law provides the tools required to
reconstruct employment contract law.

41
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The
Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513 (2014).
Good faith also precludes termination decisions that deprive the other party of the benefit
of the bargain. See 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed. 2022).
42
See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
43
See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015).
44
See St. Antoine, Making of META, supra note 16.
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I. AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW
American employment law reflects a deep-rooted ambivalence about
the contractual status of the at-will relationship. The initial articulation of
employment at-will doctrine in the late nineteenth century reflected the
prevailing freedom-of-contract ethos of the times.45 Workers in the U.S.
were ostensibly at liberty to sell their labor to whomever they chose for
however long they like as well and to cease or withhold performance at
their election. Under a primitive understanding of contract formation, this
approach implied that employers and employees had no prospective
obligations to one another. In effect, the relationship was non-contractual
by its nature.
Yet the personal and societal significance of employment
relationships raise policy concerns that demand a workable theory of
enforceable obligations. For much of history, courts have been reluctant
to recognize employee contract claims for fear of interfering with
managerial discretion and opening the proverbial floodgates to individual
claims based on scant evidence. 46 At the same time, some have been
motivated to rectify certain forms of employer abuse. Especially where
employers knowingly (or negligently) foster expectations of future
benefits, these courts have understandably sought ways to remedy the
employee’s justified reliance.47
In pursuit of these competing impulses, courts have relied almost
exclusively on classical contract principles. However, they have done so
piecemeal and in idiosyncratic fashion. Against a backdrop of uncertainty
about the contractual status of the at-will relationships, courts have
assessed the legal significance of isolated statements and documents
primarily through technical application of unilateral contracts principles.
These decisions effectively “contractualize” specific terms of the
relationship without the benefit of a sound contractual account of

45

Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 130 (1976) discussing this connection); Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread
of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment
Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 454 (2007) (“the prevailing wisdom is that the at-will
rule spread because of a judiciary fixated, from about 1890 to 1930, on laissez-faire
reasoning and freedom of contract”).
46
See infra Part I.A.
47
See infra Part I.B.
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employment as a whole.48 The result is what we refer to as employment
contract exceptionalism—a body of caselaw that is doctrinally intricate,
highly aberrational, and woefully undertheorized.
In Part II, we will expose the depth and consequences of employment
contract exceptionalism. But first, this Part explains how employment
contract law arrived at this juncture. Section A unpacks the employment
at-will “super-presumption,” as we refer to it. We reveal a trifecta of
idiosyncratic and anti-contractual proof requirements that courts applied
to impede employee claims for breach of contract and preserve their atwill status. Section B develops courts’ parallel use of unilateral contract
theory as a means of contractualizing discrete employer promises of future
benefits and compensation, while preserving employment at will.
Section C reveals how courts subsequently conscripted the unilateral
contract model to address cases involving employer job security policies.
As a result, the conventional wisdom now holds that the entire
employment at-will relationship is a species of a unilateral contract.
A. The Employment-at-Will (Super) Presumption
The disconnect between employment and mainstream contract law
dates nearly to the inception of American employment law. Since the
adoption of the infamous employment at will doctrine, 49 courts have
treatment this so-called “presumption” as something akin to a substantive
rule.50 In the paradigmatic scenario, a terminated employee sues for breach
of contract, alleging that the employer promised job security if the
employee would accept a job or remain with the employer.51 Early courts

48
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cube Wrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term,
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV 637, 638 (2007).
49
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
50
As Arnow-Richman has argued elsewhere, employment at will is a doctrine
consisting of multiple rules, which include the rule that employment is of an indefinite
duration and that it may be terminated without notice. See Arnow-Richman,
Mainstreaming, supra note 37, at 1567. These other aspects of the at-will doctrine will
become important as we reframe employment contract law, infra Part IV. For purposes of
this discussion, however we focus on the most prominent aspect of employment at will—
the ability of employers to terminate without reason—which has animated the at-will
debate within the scholarly discourse.
51
See, e.g., Hanson v. Central Show Printing, 130 N.W.2d 654 (Iowa 1964);
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872, 874 (Minn. 1936); Forrer v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967); Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 32
N.E. 802 (Ind. App. 1892); Turner v. Newsom, 3 So. 3d 913 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
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refused to permit such claims on grounds that starkly violate mainstream
contract principles. They held, first, that employees could not rely on
general expressions of employer commitment in establishing a job security
contract. 52 Second, they insisted that employees satisfy a heightened
consideration requirement.53 Third, they implicitly imposed a mutuality
requirement, pointing to the employee’s right to quit as a justification for
refusing to enforce employer promises not to fire.54 These errors reveal a
hostility to employee claims and a misunderstanding of the contractual
nature of employment.
The Iowa Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Hanson v. Central Show
Printing offers a stark example.55 Hanson, a skilled pressman, had been
employed “for many years” in a job where work was “often slack” over
the winter.56 In autumn he received an offer of a “steady job” elsewhere
and sought a similar assurance from his current employer. 57 Upon
negotiation, Hanson received a letter of commitment, stating: “I guarantee
you 40 hours work per week thru out the entire year until you retire at your
own choosing.”58 It was signed by the company president.59 Yet two years
later, when Hanson was fired without cause, the court rejected his claim
for breach of contract, affirming a directed verdict for the defendantemployer.60
Describing the question as “a simple one,” the court recited the
“generally followed” rule that:
in the absence of additional express or implied stipulation as to the
duration of the employment or of a good consideration additional to

52
See, e.g., Hanson, 130 N.W.2d at 655 (reciting the “generally followed” rule that “a
contract for permanent employment, for life employment, for as long as the employee
chooses, or for other terms purporting permanent employment, is no more than an
indefinite general hiring terminable at the will”).
53
See, e.g., Forrer, 153 N.W.2d at 589; (“a contract for permanent employment . . .
where the employee furnishes no additional consideration . . . amounts to indefinite general
hiring terminable at will”). Turner, 3 So. 3d at 917 (to prove employment was permanent
and not at-will, employee must prove they “provided substantial consideration for the
contract separate from the services to be rendered”).
54
Smith v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 62 N.W. 392 (Minn. 1895) (contract for permanent
employment lacked mutuality because “the plaintiff was not bound . . . to continue in
defendant’s service but could cease work at his pleasure”).
55
130 N.W.2d 654 (Iowa 1964).
56
Id. at 655
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 659.
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the services contracted to be rendered, a contract for permanent
employment, for life employment, for as long as the employee chooses,
or for other terms purporting permanent employment, is no more than
an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party.61

It found that Hanson’s situation fit squarely within these principles. First,
it held that the words “until you retire of your own choosing” were
equivalent to promises of lifetime or permanent employment deemed an
at-will hiring per the general rule. Second, the court held that Hanson had
not supplied any consideration beyond his continued service to the
employer.62 It disclaimed the significance of Hanson’s competing offer,
asserting that the decision to forgo alternate employer is part and parcel
with the decision to serve. According to the court, Hanson supplied
nothing beyond his continued commitment to remain an at will
employee.63
It is difficult to offer any legitimate doctrinal explanation of the
court’s conclusions. First, the employer’s letter, at least on its face, would
appear to mean what it said: that the defendant was committed to
maintaining Hanson’s employment for as long as he wished to serve. To
be sure, there were likely some implied limits on this commitment. The
parties probably would have agreed that the company retained the right to
terminate Hanson if he ceased to perform or engaged in misconduct
justifying termination. 64 However, it is plain from the letter that the
employer relinquished its broad right to terminate at will for any or no
reason, and the court identifies nothing in the factual record to suggest
otherwise. It simply substitutes its own interpretation of the employer’s
words as a matter of law, a move entirely at odds with contract law’s
commitment to interpreting contracts consistent with party intent.65

61

Id. at 655-66 (citing 35 A.L.R. 1432).
Id. at 656, 658.
63
Id. at 657 (noting that the “’abandon[ment of] other activities and interests to enter
into the service of defendant—a thing almost every desirable servant does upon entering a
new service, but which, of course, cannot be regarded as constituting any additional
consideration to the master’”) (citing Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872, 874
(Minn 1936)).
64
Cf. Savarese v. Pyrene Manufacturing Co., 89 A.2d 237 (N.J. 1952) (distinguishing
between a “lifetime” employment contract and a “just cause” contract).
65
See generally Fineman, supra note ___, at 125 (“[i]f the law on duration of service
contracts had followed the teachings of pure contract theory, the agreement established by
the parties would have been enforced [and all evidence of party intent would have been
considered]”).
62
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Second, the determination that Hanson failed to supply adequate
consideration violates the equally fundamental principle that courts do
inquire into the quality of contractual exchange. Pursuant to the bargain
principle of contract law, the role of the court is merely to enforce the
parties’ terms, so long as they have agreed. 66 In Hanson, the parties
reached an agreement whereby Hanson would forego an attractive job
offer in exchange for the employer’s commitment to providing long-term,
full-time employment for as long as Hanson wished to remain. Whatever
value the court may assign to Hanson’s forbearance, the requisite
exchange is obvious. There is no justification consistent with contract law
for requiring anything more.67
Hanson’s requirement of consideration “in addition to” his continued
service suggests a third doctrinal error.68 Early contract cases held that
consideration required not just an exchange, but so-called mutuality of
obligation—a set of symmetrical commitments that matched one another
in substance. 69 In the case of a contract for job security, this sincediscredited doctrine would have insisted on a reciprocal promise by the
employee to remain on the job for the duration of the employer’s
commitment. Courts have long recognized, however, that such an
understanding is at odds with the bargain principle.70 If there is an agreedupon exchange, there is no reason for parties’ commitments to be equal in
form just as there is no reason for them to be equal in value.
Indeed, Hanson recites this very principle. 71 Yet its rationale for
requiring additional consideration is explicitly grounded in the Hanson’s
ability to terminate:

66

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (“To constitute
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.").
67
See generally Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
1082, 1098–99 (1984) (describing the concept that “additional consideration” is required
to overcome the presumption of employment at will as a “spurious contractual doctrine”
and arguing that “[a]s any first semester law student knows . . . one performance can be
consideration to support two or even twenty promises” and that “[t]he work performed
could be consideration for both the wages paid and the promise of future employment”).
68
Id. at 1227.
69
See 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6.1 (2022); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (4th ed.)
§ 7:14.
70
See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (“If the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of …equivalence in the values
exchanged [or] ‘mutuality of obligation.’”).
71
130 N.W.2d at 656 (“[M]ere lack of mutuality in and of itself does not render a
contract invalid.”) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Veland, 224 N.W. 467, 469).
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We think the real basis for the… rule is that there is in fact no binding
contract for life employment when the employee has not agreed to it;
that is, when he is free to abandon it at any time…It does not help to
say that a contract for life employment, or permanent employment,
may be binding if it is fully agreed upon, even though the only
consideration furnished by the employee is his agreement to serve. The
fact is he has not agreed to serve for life, or permanently; but only so
long as he does not elect to ‘retire of his own choosing.’72

Thus, despite its purported rejection of mutuality, the court resurrects that
very requirement. The anomalous “additional consideration” rule of
employment at-will is its contemporary proxy.
From this trifecta of errors—the requirement of “additional
consideration,” the resurrection of mutuality principles, and the refusal to
interpret assurances of long-term employment consistent with their plain
meaning—employment-at-will has evolved into something beyond a mere
presumption or a “default rule,” as it is sometimes described.73 A default
rule applies absent an agreement to the contrary, yet Hanson rejects the
employer’s express commitment in favor of reinstituting the supposed
default. Employment at will is better described as a substantive doctrine—
a super-presumption—that stands as a near impervious barrier to
successful claims of employer breach of contract.
The policy underlying this approach is not difficult to imagine. Courts
doubtlessly feared a rush of breach of contract claims based on scant
evidence. An employee’s testimony that he or she had been assured longterm, secure employment could be highly persuasive but difficult to
dispute. Nor are substantiated statements necessarily evidence of
contractual commitment. An employer’s assurance that employment will
be long term or that employees are never terminated without cause may be
aspirational. In some cases, one might analogize it to the type of “puffing”
that courts routinely disregard in the commercial sales context.74
Yet the depth of the court’s errors, as well as the facts before it,
suggest something more at play. Hanson produced a written document
signed by the company president. His was hardly a frivolous claim
premised on puffery, and nothing in the opinion doubts the integrity of his

72

Id. at 658.
See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1990) (distinguishing default from
mandatory rules).
74
See generally Wayne K. Lewis, Toward a Theory of Strict “Claim” Liability:
Warranty Relief for Advertising Representations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1986).
73
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evidence. Rather the court focuses on the indeterminate nature of Hanson’s
promise, treating his commitment as too indefinite to constitute an
enforceable obligation. In addition to consideration and assent, formal
contract law requires a threshold degree of specificity for contract
formation.75 That threshold is often described as terms that providing an
objective basis for crafting a remedy. 76 As we will see, contract law
became increasingly tolerant of open term agreements over time consistent
with its retreat from other formal principles.77 At this juncture what is
important, however, is the way in which the rhetoric in Hanson reflects an
inability to recognize at-will employment as the basis for a binding
obligation. Throughout its analysis, and in its review of prior cases,
Hanson describes the hypothetical difficulties of calculating damages for
the employer’s breach given the uncertainty of Hanson’s own
commitment. 78 In its eyes, an agreement in which one or more parties
retain the right to terminate at will is simply not a contract at all.
In sum, the historical approach to employment-at-will and the nature
of the super-presumption” reveal a great deal about the origin of
employment contract exceptionalism. From early on, employment
contract law deviated profoundly from mainstream contract law in both
explicit and implicit ways. Courts blatantly misapplied principles of
consideration and assent at the same time as they purported to rely on those
very doctrines. These moves were perhaps instrumental at best,
disingenuous at worse. At the same time, courts’ analysis in early cases
betrays genuine uncertainty about the contractual status of the
employment relationship as a whole. Absent a reciprocal commitment
involving a specified duration or term of employment, courts seem unable
to conceptualize employment as a binding agreement. This fundamental
error, and the analytically flawed cases it engendered, comprised an
unstable foundation for future jurisprudential development.

75
The oft-cited case for this proposition within the contracts canon is, coincidentally,
an employment case, albeit involving compensation rather than job security. See Varney v.
Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916) (finding employer’s promise to provide employee
a “fair” share of its profits too indefinite to enforce).
76
Cf. id.
77
See infra Part IV.A.
78
Hanson, 130 N.W.2d at 659 (“Many difficulties would arise . . .in the way of
determining the damages because of uncertainty of type of employment, or rate of pay, or
how much his loss might be mitigated”).
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B. Unilateral Contract Theory and Deferred Benefits
The previous section described the at will super-presumption and
revealed how courts misapply doctrine to limit employee breach of
contract claims. This section turns to an important exception. For over a
century, courts have held that employer promises of future compensation
or benefits—as opposed to promises of job security—may be contractually
binding. 79 These deferred benefits cases, as we refer to them, yielded
positive outcomes for employees. However, they also introduced the
central error of employment contract exceptionalism: the idea that
employment is a unilateral contract. This section explains how that
happened.
The use of unilateral contract theory in employment law began as a
way for courts to hold employers to a specific subset of promises despite
the at-will employment doctrine. Since the early 1900s, courts have held
that employer promises of additional payments, beyond straight
compensation for work performed, could be contractually binding. These
cases generally involve assurances of some form of deferred compensation
such as bonuses, profit sharing, severance pay, commissions, stock options
or retirement benefits. 80 Typically, the employer promises that if the
employee remains in service, usually for an identified period of time, the
employee will earn the additional pay.81
In the most compelling cases, the employee receives a direct and
specific assurance from the employer, remains in the job in reliance on the

79
See, e.g., Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517 (1912); Scholl v. Hershey
Chocolate Co., 71 Pa. Super. 244 (1919); Henderson Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17
Ala. App. 337 (1920); Orton & Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App. 462 (1920);
Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406 (1922); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470
(1923); Wellington v. Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358 (1925).
80
See, e.g., Henderson Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App. 337 (1920)
(bonus); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470 (1923) (bonus); Orton & Steinbrenner
Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App. 462 (1920) (profit share); Wellington v. Con P. Curran
Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358 (profit share); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light
Co., 57 Ohio App. 203 (1937) (pension plan).
81
Henderson Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App. 337 (1920) (four months of
continuous work); Roberts v. Mays Mills, 184 N.C. 406 (1922) (remain employed until
end of year); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co., 125 Wash. 470 (1923) (continue in service until
completion of contracted work); Orton & Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App.
462 (1920) (600 hours work over course of the year); Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction
& Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203 (1937) (20 years continuous service).
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promise, but is denied payment despite working for the requisite period.82
In such situations, courts understandably sought to redress what appeared
to be an obvious injustice. 83 Unilateral contract theory offered an
expedient means of achieving the desired outcome using the type of formal
contract analysis courts gravitated to in employment termination
disputes. 84 As classically formulated, unilateral contract is one that is
accepted by the offeree’s performance rather than a return promise.85 In its
classic presentation, an offeree successfully meets a challenge, satisfies a
dare, or fulfills the requirements for a posted reward. In these situations,
the promisor’s solicitation constitutes the offer, and the promisee’s
completion of the requested performance provides both the consideration
and the acceptance.86
Many deferred benefits fit comfortably within this “reward
paradigm,” as we refer to it. Scott v. J.F. Duthie offers an early example.87
The plaintiff was a foreman in the defendant’s shipyard employed for an
“indefinite” period.88 The employer issued a statement promising a bonus
of one million dollars to be split among all foremen who continued in its
employ through the company’s completion of its pending ship building
contracts with the U.S. government.89 The plaintiff obliged, remaining on
the job for an additional two years, but did not receive the bonus.90
On appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, the
Washington Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had pleaded all of the
82

See, e.g., Henderson Land & Labor Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App. 337 (1920); Orton
& Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App. 462 (1920); Scott v. J.F. Duthie & Co.,
125 Wash. 470, 470-71 (1923); Wellington v. Con. P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App.
358 (1925); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Smith, 36 Ohio L. Rep. 359 (1931).
83
See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 564 (1983)
(describing full performance cases as the “strongest case for enforcement for the
employer’s promise because they are based on benefits actually conferred on the promisor
by the promisee by reason of the promise”).
84
See supra Part I.A. For instance, courts might have brought non-contractual theories
like restitution and promissory estoppel to bear in resolving such cases.
85
See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (2022) § 6:2 (explaining the “traditional” contract
doctrine).
86
See id.
87
216 P. 853 (Wash. 1923).
88
Id. at 853. Scott’s wages and basic terms of employment were in a writing and
required advance notice of termination. Id. However, that fact does not appear to have
changed the court’s perception that Scott’s employment was at will. It refers to his
employment as being for an “indefinite duration.” Id.
89
The statement appears to have been in writing, but the facts do not reveal how the
defendant disseminated it. Id. at 853.
90
Id.
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elements of a unilateral contract. 91 It rejected the employer’s argument
that the contract lacked or required mutuality, as well as the argument that
the plaintiff had provided only his labor as consideration.92 In contrast to
the job security cases, where such assertions swayed courts, Scott correctly
observed that the employer’s promise neither sought nor required a
reciprocal commitment. 93 The court drew explicitly on the unilateral
contract canon, referring to the disputed bonus as a “reward.”94 It held that
defendant’s promise could constitute an offer that the employee properly
accepted and fulfilled by remaining in the defendant’s employ for the
desired period.95
In this way, courts’ appeal to unilateral contract doctrine in deferred
benefits cases could be seen as partially corrective. It allowed courts to
avoid some of the doctrinal errors that plague job security cases.96 Notably,
it also reinforced employment at will in ways that protected the employee.
The existence of a valid contract within the unilateral model depends
entirely on the employee’s freedom to terminate. It is only because the
employee forebears from exercising that right that the employee’s
continued performance for the specified time constitutes consideration.97
Judged in this light, the unilateral contract frame doubly protects workers,
preserving their discretion to leave, while enforcing the employer’s
promise should they remain.98
Yet these advantages came at the cost of further degradation of
employment contract law. The unilateral contract framework describes
promises of “work rewards” reasonably well, but only by artificially

91

Id.
Id. at 854.
93
Id. at 854.
94
Id. at 853.
95
Id.
96
See e.g, Chinn v. China Aviation, 291 P.2d 91, 103 (finding employee was entitled
to alleged unilateral contract for promised severance pay in addition to his wages, noting
that a “’single consideration may support the several counterpromises made by the other
party’”); Henderson Land, 85 So. At 36 (“When…one makes a promise conditioned upon
the doing of an act by another, and the latter does the act, the contract is not void for want
of mutuality…for upon performance of the conditions by the promisee the contract
becomes clothed with a valid consideration.”).
97
See id. at 853 (“[The employee] was free to quit his work at any time, and therefore
was under no obligation to do the thing which the respondent was seeking [. C]ompliance
with the terms of the offer created a contract.”).
98
Pettit, supra note ___ at , 553 (suggesting that courts in such cases embraced
unilateral contract doctrine because it would have been both inaccurate and undesirable
either to require or infer a return promise by the employee).
92
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isolating that single term of employment. This fragmented treatment of
contract terms is at odds with general contract law. Ordinarily contract law
takes the entirety of the parties’ exchange as comprising a single contract
consisting of multiple terms. 99 By contrast the deferred benefits cases,
either explicitly or implicitly, treat the unilateral contract as a stand-alone
agreement. In Scott, the court refers to the bonus as a “supplementary”
contract, one that binds in addition to the employee’s basic terms of hire.100
In other cases, courts seem to consider the promised benefit to be the only
contractual component of the parties’ relationship. These cases, like the
previously described job security cases, seem to view a basic
“reward-free” at-will relationship as non-contractual.
A more authentic contractual treatment would begin from the
employment relationship as a whole, absorbing the promise of a work
reward as one term of a larger, and necessarily bilateral, agreement. We
will explore this idea further in the parts that follow.101 What is important
from an historical perspective is that employment contract law, in yet
another exceptionalist move, evolved in precisely the opposite direction.
At some point in the mid-twentieth century, even as courts continued to
analyze work rewards as fragmented agreements, cases began to describe
the entire employment relationship as a species of unilateral contract.102
Oddly, this development appears to have come about at the same time
as mainstream contract law was distancing itself from the distinction
between bilateral and unilateral contracts. As we will see, over the course
of the twentieth century courts relaxed many classical contracts principles
in favor of more liberal rules of contract formation and interpretation.103
What accounts for the employment contract anomaly is unclear. It appears
to have been driven at least part by Professor Arthur Corbin’s well-known
treatise. In what proved a highly influential section, Corbin described

99
This idea is a corollary to the bargain principle, which embraces contracts in which
one party makes many commitments in exchange for a single return commitment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80 (1981). It is also the reason why courts’ the
requirement of “additional consideration” to support an employer’s job requirement is anticontractual as previously discussed. See supra Part I.A.
100
Scott, 216 P. at 853; see also Chinn, 291 P.2d at 100.
101
See infra Part IV.
102
See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980); Langdon v. Saga Corp.,
569 P.2d 524, 527 (1976).
103
See generally 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.9; infra Part II.A.1.
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employment-at-will as “not a contract at all” but rather “an expression in
which the promises are illusory.”104 He continues:
In many cases, such an agreement is an operative offer that can be
accepted by rendering all, or some indicated portion, of the
service…agreed upon. Such rendition of performance … binds the
other party to pay the specified compensation. If the party rendering
performance has made no promise of any other performances, either
expressly or tacitly…. the contract now created is a unilateral
contract.105

Corbin acknowledged that an employee might make an explicit or implicit
return promise.106 Yet his treatise did not explore that possibility or its
implications. What courts took away was the idea that employment should
be contractually analyzed exclusively under unilateral principles.107
In sum, unilateral contract theory offered courts an expedient way of
achieving a desired result, but at the cost of further employment contract
exceptionalism. It introduced a fragmented model of employment contract
law and increased confusion about the contractual nature of the
employment relationship as a whole.
C. Employer Policies and the Use of Legal Fictions
Such was the state of affairs when the era of common law
“exceptions” to employment-at-will arrived. During the 1980s, a wave of
more employee-friendly judicial decisions dialed back the super
presumption and created new paths to employer liability for wrongful
discharge.108 For this short period of time, courts took a more permissive
approach to employee claims of termination in breach of contract. In
contrast to prior cases, these decisions permitted claims based on oral

104

ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS Sec. 96 (1960)
Id. It should be noted that the contemporary edition of Corbin’s treatise still
describes employment principally in unilateral contract terms, see 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 152, despite disclaiming the importance of the distinction elsewhere. Id. at § 3.9.
106
See id. (suggesting that this is “often” the case).
107
See, e.g., Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (1976); Wagner v. City of
Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 85 (1986); Demasse v. ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 500, 504-05 (1999)
(citing Wagner); Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 75 n. 4 (2000).
108
Many scholars have explored the jurisprudence of this era, its underlying policies,
and its limitations and implications. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge Protections in an AtWill World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1656–57 (1996); Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable
Demise of Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345 (2008);
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 26-27 (1993)
105
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promises of continued employment,109 recognized that employer promises
might be derived from the circumstances, 110 and most importantly for
present purposes, held that an employer’s written policies could be the
source of a binding commitment to job security.111
Courts did not rely on one theory of contract law in recognizing these
types of claims, but followed different, sometimes competing, doctrinal
threads depending on the jurisdiction and factual circumstances. Yet in the
context of employer job security policies, the deferred benefits
jurisprudence provided a robust and closely analogous body of
precedent. 112 Courts drew explicitly, though not exclusively, on the
unilateral contract principles described in those cases, often citing
Corbin’s formulation of the unilateral nature of employment.113 In an early
example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille held that an employer’s written termination policies could be
enforceable “if they meet the requirements for formation of a unilateral
contract.”114 Since an offer of employment for an indefinite duration can
constitute a valid offer to contract, the court reasoned, so too could
promises contained in a personnel manual.115 Applying those principles,
the Pine River court concluded that the employer’s disciplinary policy “set
out in definite language an offer of a unilateral contract,” that the offer was
“communicated to the employees,” and that the plaintiff’s “continued
performance of his duties despite his freedom to quit” constituted an
acceptance of the offer and the consideration needed to enforce it.116

109

See, e.g., Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988).
See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981)
111
See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
112
See J.H. Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: Finding a Way to
Enforce Employee Handbook Promises, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES (Samuel Estreicher
& Gillian Lester eds., 2007). (describing how a severance case formed the basis for
plaintiff’s counsel’s litigation strategy in the seminal job security policy case).
113
See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983)
(fining enforceable unilateral contract for job security relying on mid-century cases
enforcing employer promises of bonus pay).
114
Id. at 627.
115
Id. at 626-27 (“If the handbook language constitutes an offer, … The employee's
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract; by
continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave, the employee supplies the necessary
consideration.”).
116
Id. at 630.
110
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The analysis in Pine River is notably formulaic, proceeding in
lockstep with earlier precedent. The court does not ask hard questions
about the employee’s awareness of the employer’s policy or reliance on
its terms. Such aspects of contract formation are likely to be difficult to
prove with respect to any particular plaintiff. Neither does the court
meaningfully inquire into the employer’s contractual intent. It notes the
inherent benefits to the employer of such a policy in the form of “a more
stable and, presumably, more productive work force.” 117 But this
observation provides a policy justification rather than a legal basis for
enforcement.
As we will explore more fully in Part III, the Michigan Supreme
Court went in a very different direction when confronted with the same
question.118 In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the court dispensed
with contract formalities outright, holding that written policies can become
binding based on workers’ “legitimate expectations.”119 Yet while many
courts subsequently cited Toussaint, none were willing to rely solely on
new, informal grounds for enforcement or employer policies.120 Unilateral
contract theory remained the coin of the realm.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s seminal treatment of the issue in
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche is illustrative. 121 In a decision openly
skeptical of employment at-will, and relying heavily on Toussaint, the
court observed that the enforcement of employer handbooks makes sense
as a matter of employees’ legitimate expectations. The court cited the
official nature of the employee handbook, its widespread distribution, the
absence of individual contracts in the workplace, and the company’s
reputation as an employer of choice. 122 Together these facts created an
environment in which employees would almost certainly view the contents
of the employer’s policy manual as a binding commitment.
Even so, Woolley did not rely on these factual realities in reaching a
decision. Rather it cloaked its analysis in unilateral contract doctrine. The
court held that a jury could find “in strict contract terms” that Hoffmann-

117

Id. at 631.
292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
119
Id. at 885.
120
See infra Part III.
121
491 A.2d 1257 (NJ 1983).
122
Id. at 1265.
118
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La Roche’s handbook “constituted an offer,”123 and that the employee’s
continued employment provided the requisite consideration for the
formation of a unilateral contract:
In most of the cases involving an employer’s personnel policy manual,
the document …… seeks no return promise from the employees. It is
reasonable to interpret it as seeking continued work from the
employees, who, in most cases, are free to quit …. Thus analyzed, the
manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—
the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding
being their continued work when they have no obligation to
continue.124

As this analysis suggests, the use of unilateral contract law allowed
the court to sidestep the problem of finding a return promise by the
employee, just as it had in the deferred benefits cases. But it raised other
challenges that earlier courts had not fully reconciled. The earliest (and
easiest) deferred benefits cases alleged that the employer’s work reward
promise was made after the employee had begun employment and that the
plaintiff knew of and relied on it in continuing work.125 The Woolley court
obliquely acknowledged the limitations of its analysis in situations where
the employee could prove neither. But rather than fully dispense with the
requirements of the contractual framework as Michigan did, Woolley
concluded that such elements could be “presumed.”126
This is not to suggest that Woolley was without support. At least some
deferred benefits cases took a loose view of the requisite knowledge and
intent necessary to establish the employee’s contractual assent. 127 The
point is that the job security policy cases fully revealed the limits of the
unilateral framework in cases where much more than an isolated promise
was at stake. In light of the challenges, courts might have elected a more
informal approach to employer policy enforcement; instead they doubled
down on the unilateral framework. Unilateral contract became the means
for enforcing not only employee rewards but employment security, or as

123

Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1267.
125
Chinn v. China Aviation, 291 P.2d 91; (CA) Scott v. J.F. Duthie, 216 P. 853 (WA
1923).
126
Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1169 (citing Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
143 A.2d 762 (N.J. Super. 1958)).
127
See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Pwr., 143 A.2d 762 (N.J. Super. 1958)
(presuming reliance on promise of deferred benefits).
124
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Woolley describes it: “the single most important” term of the relationship,
the one on which all others depend.128
II. THE MISAPPLICATION OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT LAW
The previous Part explained the roots of employment contract
exceptionalism and traced the rise of unilateral contract theory as the
dominant framework for judicial analysis of employer promises. This Part
unpacks the legacy of that jurisprudence.
We begin by situating judicial reliance on unilateral contract theory
within mainstream contract law. Contract scholars have long considered
unilateral contract doctrine a fringe framework, useful for describing only
a narrow subset of highly discrete transactions. Employment is anything
but discrete. It is a fluid, indefinite and long-term relationship—what we
term a “hyper-relational” contract. It is impossible to describe a particular
“performance” that an employee must “complete” in order to bind the
employer within the unilateral framework.
Yet this has not stopped judges from trying. Through the lens of
handbook modification jurisprudence, we expose how courts contort
contract doctrine, producing a confused and unhelpful body of law.
Technical reasoning obscures the underlying motivation for judicial
results and clashes against the real-life conditions under which
employment relationships form and develop. The result is that
employment law lacks a coherent basis for understanding binding
obligation within this important relationship.
A. The Law & Scholarship of Unilateral Contracts
If it were up to contracts scholars, there would be no such thing as
unilateral contracts. Since the mid-twentieth century, the law has moved
away from that concept along with other formal principles of classical
doctrine. This section explores that history, situating employment
contract’s anomalous reliance on unilateral contract theory within the
development of mainstream contract law.

128
Id. at ___. As the court notes “Wages, promotions, conditions of work, hours of
work, all of those take second place to job security, for without that all other benefits are
vulnerable.”
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1. The Doctrine and Its Discontents
A typical contract is a bilateral affair: two parties make reciprocal
commitments to do something in the future. At the moment of agreement,
that is, upon their exchange of promises, a contract is born. If either party
reneges or fails to perform, the other may sue for breach.129
Yet contract law has long recognized a supposedly different species
of voluntary obligation under which only one party makes any future
commitment. As discussed in Part I, the prototype for these so-called
unilateral contracts 130 is the promise of a reward that seeks to induce
completion of a difficult or uncertain task.131 The difference between the
two contracts lies in the moment at which legal obligation arises. In a
bilateral contract the offeree promises to perform, thereby making a
commitment and immediately binding the offeror to the resulting contract.
As originally theorized, however, under the unilateral framework the
offeree makes no commitment and may perform or not at their pleasure.132
Absent performance, there is no contract at all, merely an offer that has

129
The idea of enforceable fully executory contracts, i.e., one in which no party has
incurred any loss, dates to Lon Fuller & Purdue’s seminal article, articulating the
“expectation interest” of contract parties—the need to be able to rely on eventual
fulfillment of a present bargain—essential to a functioning market. Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936-37); see also Samuel J.
Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J.
515, 519 (1955) (asserting that “the true reason for enforcing bilateral contracts lies in the
necessity of protecting the parties' mutual trust and credit simply because without this
protection a modem credit-economy could not possibly function”).
130
The original invocation of the distinction and use of the terminology
unilateral/bilateral terminology is generally attributed to Christopher Langdell. See David
G. Epstein & Yvette Joy Liebesman, Bearded Ladies Walking on the Brooklyn Bridge, 59
ARK. L. REV. 267, 271-75 (2006) (discussing Langdell’s early use of concept and its
adoption by courts and treatise writers); Peter Meiges Tiersma Reassessing Unilateral
Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (19921993)(describing the traditional understanding of the nature and consequences of unilateral
offers as “Langdell’s rule”); and was supported and memorialized by Williston in his iconic
treatise. Stoljar, supra note ___, at 523.
131
Classic examples from the chestnut cases/law school hypos include finding a
wayward pet or returning a lost object, scaling a greased flagpole, entering a contest or
sweepstakes, deploying a Victorian era flu remedy, or (perhaps most famously of all)
crossing the Brooklyn Bridge.
132
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 12 (defining “unilateral” contract as “one in
which no promisor receives a promise as consideration for his promise”). For discussions
of the unilateral/bilateral distinction see generally Epstein, supra note ___, at ___; Pettit,
supra note ___, at ___; Stoljar, supra note ___, at ___; Tiersma supra note ___, at ___.
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not been accepted.133 In this way, the concept of a unilateral (i.e., “onesided”) contract offers a double advantage to offerees in cases when
making a reciprocal commitment would be risky or undesirable. The
offeree knows they will not be held contractually liable for a performance
they cannot control or guarantee; yet they can rely on the offeror following
through on the promise to pay should they succeed.134
At the same time, the unilateral framework gives rise to unique perils,
such as the familiar problem of every first-year contracts course: midperformance revocation. Because a unilateral contract is not consummated
until the offeree tenders full performance, the offeror could, in theory,
revoke in the midst of the offeree’s performance and walk away liability
free.135 Much scholarly ink was spilt in the early twentieth century over
this problematic implication and unjust outcome.136 This “first-generation
critique,” as we refer to it, led to Section 45 of the Restatement of
Contracts. Section 45 deems the offeree’s partial performance the
acceptance of an option or conditional contract that binds the offeror
subject to the offeree’s completion of the performance in full. 137 Thus,
under contemporary law, the offeror who challenges an offeree to climb a
flagpole for a certain sum must, once the offeree begins, allow reasonable
time for the offeree to reach the top or be held liable for breach.
In addition to circumscribing the offeror’s revocation rights, the First
Restatement sought to reduce reliance on the unilateral framework

133

Tiersma, supra note ___, at 38-39 (explaining the conventionally understood
distinction).
134
A recurring example where the unilateral contract model remains apt is the broker
contract under which the agent will be paid if a sale is completed. Neither party would
expect the agent to incur liability in the event no sale is effected. See, e.g., Marchiando v.
Scheck, 432 P.2d 404 (NM 1967). This is true, however, only where the agency is nonexclusive. An exclusive listing agreement is usually interpreted as imposing mutual
obligations on both parties. This owes in large part to the implied duty of good faith, which
we will turn to in Part IV.
135
See Tiersema, supra note ___ at 1 (calling this “[o]ne of the most notorious rules of
traditional contract law”). Stoljar at 520. This result is often depicted through the wellknown “Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical” coined by Professor Wormser. See id.; Epstein,
supra, note ___at 276.
136
See Tiersma, supra note ___, at 6-7 (discussing early twentieth century academic
debate over how to mitigate the effects of a unilateral offer).
137
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45; The adoption of Section 45 put to rest a
vigorous academic debate of the early twentieth century over the consequences of part
performance. Epstein, supra, note ___ at 281 (discussing the evolution of Restatement
Section 45 and these mitigating doctrines.
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altogether. Section 31 provided that “[i]n case of doubt it is presumed that
an offer invites the formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance
amounting…to a promise….rather than the formation of one or more
unilateral contracts by actual performance.” 138 The effect was to push
more offers into the bilateral category, permitting the offeree to
immediately close the deal by promissory acceptance and reducing the
number of cases in which an offeror could plausibly claim to have lawfully
revoked in the first place.139
Adopting these two sections, however, did not eradicate unilateral
contract offers, nor did it signal an end to debates over the
unilateral/bilateral distinction. First, Section 31, while favoring bilateral
formation, still allowed room for an offeror either to explicitly designate
an offer as unilateral permitting only a performance-based acceptance.
Second, even with the protections of Section 45, characterizing an offer as
unilateral left the offeree at risk of loss due to reliance prior to the start of
the requested performance.140 If the offeror revokes after reliance occurs,
but before the offeree starts performance, the offeree will suffer an
uncompensated loss. 141 In effect then, the continued availability of the
unilateral contract framework allowed the offeror to push back the
moment of acceptance, preserving additional time in which to speculate
on the value of the solicited performance.
This potential for continued harsh effects seems especially
problematic when judged against the “fact-conditions” under which real
life contracting occurs. 142 Toward the mid-twentieth century, Karl
Llewellyn, the principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, took
aim at the “great dichotomy” between bilateral and unilateral contracts,
challenging the core belief that offers must fall into either one category or
the other. Llewellyn’s attack was part of his broader disenchantment with

138

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 31.
See Epstein, supra note ___, at 284-85 (explaining this intention and result).
140
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45, comment f (distinguishing between
performance and preparation for performance). This might occur where the employee
makes tangible investments into equipment, training or supplies in order to be in a position
to perform, or where planning to perform involves opportunity costs such as foregoing
other endeavors.
141
Possibly redressed under promissory estoppel but only if and to the extent that
injustice is otherwise unavoidable. (Epstein notes the distinction.
142
K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II, 48 YALE L.J.
779, 779 (1939)
139
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what he described as the “orthodox” view of contract formation.143 He
argued that commercial actors engaged in business transactions generally
do not think about offer and acceptance let alone about how the latter
should be effected. 144 It therefore made little sense to assign legal
consequences based on such esoteric concepts. He allowed that certain
unique factual contexts could give rise to deals fairly described as binding
only one party. Such “true” unilateral contracts, however, were to his mind
so rare and distinct as to be unworthy of a special category.145 Outside that
context, whether a contract forms by performance or promise is an
academic question offering an opportunity for "superb classroom
theatrics" but little else.146
This “second-generation” critique of unilateral contracts, like the one
before it, proved influential in the academic establishment. Both the UCC,
under Llewellyn’s stewardship, and later, the Second Restatement
abandoned the unilateral/bilateral terminology. They also rejected the idea
that every offer by its nature is either unilateral or bilateral—that it
requires a particular and exclusive manner of acceptance. Both the UCC
and the Second Restatement provide that an offer may be accepted in “any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances,” giving the
offeree maximum flexibility to bind the offeror.147
Still, as with the First Restatement, these reforms did not fully
eliminate the unilateral contract or prevent continued controversy about its
use. Neither the words “unilateral” and “bilateral,” nor the conceptual
distinction they embody, fully disappeared from the common law lexicon.
First, the Second Restatement carried forth the distinction, referring to
acceptances effected either through promise or performance, albeit
without employing the unilateral/bilateral terminology. 148 Second, the
143
K.N. Llewellyn, supra note 143, at 780 (1939) (using the term “orthodox” to refer
to refer to “taught doctrine” generally “conceive[d] as true and wise” but which “does not
well fit the fact-conditions” of actual business deals). See also Llewellyn, Case-Law II, at
800; K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance I, 48 YALE L.J.
1, 36 (1938).
144
Llewellyn, Case-Law II, supra, note ___, at 800.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 801.
147
U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 30(2).
148
Some have suggested for this reason that the change in the second Restatement is
merely cosmetic. See Epstein & Libeson, supra note ___ at 284 (describing the Second
Restatement's approach as a change in name only akin to substituting politically correct
language for an outdated sounding concept).
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Second Restatement and the U.C.C. recognize the possibility that a
particular offer may, by virtue of precise language or unique
circumstances, require acceptance by performance.149
Finally, and most importantly, courts have continued to use the
language of bilateral and unilateral contracts in deciding cases despite the
scholarly consensus. Liberalized principles of acceptance granting
discretion to the offeree allow almost any contract to be formed bilaterally.
Thus, unilateral contract theory ought to be limited to the small subset of
cases that align with the classic reward paradigm—situations in which
neither party desires nor expects the offeree to commit ex ante. Yet courts
have deployed the concept in an idiosyncratic collection of contexts that
bear no resemblance to the reward paradigm, including insurance
contracts, contracts between citizens and the government, and most
relevant to this article, employment.150 Although it gets no respect from
contracts scholars, unilateral contract theory has persisted in the face of
relentless criticism.
2. In Praise of Unilateral Employment Contracts?
As we showed in Part I, the theory has particularly come to dominate
judicial analysis of employee handbooks and informal employer
assurances of job security. And yet, only a few scholars have meaningfully
interrogated the judicial extension of unilateral contract theory to the
employment relationship or to other factual contexts that fall outside the
classic reward paradigm.151 Indeed much of employment law scholarship
takes the unilateral frame as a given.152 As we will see, those scholars that

149
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (“U.C.C.”) § 2-206 (permitting acceptance by any
reasonable medium “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances”); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 32 (giving the offeree leeway in choosing
manner of acceptance in “case of doubt” about offeror’s intention).
150
See generally Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance
Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 85 (2010) (discussing insurance contracts); Pettit, supra note ___, at 545-50
(discussing employment and citizen-state contracts).
151
See Beh & Stempfl supra note ___; Epstein & Libeson supra note ___; Pettit supra
note ___; Tiersma, supra note ___.
152
This is notable in the relatively deep literature on employee handbook modification.
See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law
Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 11 (2003). But cf. Katherine
M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A “Comparative
Conversation” Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 901
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consider the question generally praise the approach as an innovative, if
contractually dubious, means of achieving justice for employees within
the confines of existing doctrine.
The phenomenon was for the most part ignored until the late 1980s
when Professor Mark Pettit wrote an article approving the approach as a
creative way of ensuring institutional accountability to individuals. 153
Examining the employment context, Pettit suggested that by using the
framework courts did justice to employees’ reliance interest while also
protecting employees from the implication of improvident promises.154
The unilateral theory allowed a court to prohibit an employer from
reneging on its promise to pay a bonus to those who completed a certain
period of service without also requiring employees to bind themselves to
serve for the same term. 155
Writing just a few years later, Professor Peter Tiersma, sought to
retheorize the unilateral contract model, and in particular the Restatement
doctrines limiting the right to revoke unilateral offers. 156 Using
employment as an example, he asserted that an employer’s commitment
to pay a bonus or benefit is best understood as a conditional promise,
binding upon utterance, rather than as an offer seeking any form of
acceptance, through performance or otherwise.157 According to Tiersma,
such an approach would allow courts to infer conditions that would protect
the employer—for instance by partially excusing the company in the event
of poor economic conditions—and offer courts a way to tailor employee
remedies in such circumstances.158
Both Tiersma’s and Pettit’s contributions recognize some of the
limitations of unilateral contract analysis, as conventionally applied, to

(2006) (comparing the English approach to the question as “distinctly bilateral”). We
explore this topic in the next section. See infra Part II.B.2.
153
Pettit, supra note ___, at 552.
154
Pettit, supra note ___, at 565
155
Pettit, supra note ___, at 565 (“Few legal principles are more widely shared than
the notion that, unless he explicitly agrees to work for a fixed term, an employee makes no
promise of continued service to his employer.”)
156
Tiersma, supra note ___, at 62.
157
Tiersma, supra note ___, at 62-63.
158
Thus, for instance, a court could deem an employer’s promise to provide a bonus
conditional on the company’s financial performance, allowing for an employee who was
laid off prior to completing performance to obtain a pro-rata expectation remedy. Id. at 65.
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employment cases. 159 Yet their work accepts, and to some extent
reinvigorates, unilateral contract theory. Pettit sees the employment cases
as renewing and revitalizing an otherwise discarded concept. Tiersma
embraces them in support of a promissory theory of contract liability.
However, both scholars focus exclusively on promises of future benefits,
the type of commitments that hew most closely to the traditional reward
paradigm.160 Neither scholar considers courts’ application of the unilateral
framework to job security promises. Indeed, Tiersma imagines the right to
terminate at will to be one of the possible “conditions” limiting the
enforceability of an employer’s promise.
Scholarship examining the use of unilateral contract theory in cases
of handbook promises to job security have been more skeptical of the
analysis. Professor Stephen Befort, in an article focused on the legal
significance of handbook disclaimers, is frank about the “uneasy” fit
between the two. As he explains:
[Almost all of the] unilateral contract elements are [presumed] by the
court rather than intended by the parties. … [E]mployers have no
intention of extending a contractual offer when issuing an employee
handbook. Similarly, the court infers the employee's acceptance and
consideration from conduct that, in reality, could occur regardless of
the handbook's existence. The notion of a bargained-for exchange in
this setting is a fiction, but the fiction is convenient and understandable.
These advantages have induced courts to stretch unilateral contract
theory in order to achieve a desirable policy result: the enforcement of
handbook promises that benefit employers by creating legitimate
expectations among the work force.161

Thus, Befort forthrightly acknowledges the doctrinal shortcomings of
handbook cases, viewing judicial invocation of the unilateral contract
framework as a desirable instrumentalist move that protects employees.
Writing in the early 1990s, Befort imagines the possibility of a “new
theoretical framework,” one grounded in the economic advantages
employers achieve by inculcating expectations of job security among their
workforce.

159

Pettit acknowledges, for instance, that several of the elements of contract formation
are implied in the employment context. See Pettit, supra note ___, at 553.
160
As previously noted, use of unilateral contract analysis is on its surest footing when
applied to such cases. See supra Part I.B..
161
Befort, supra note ___, at 342-43.
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As we will soon see, however, that prediction did not come to pass.162
Most courts continued to rely on unilateral contract doctrine, not only in
handbook policy cases, but also in theorizing various employee
commitments. In 2006, Professor David Epstein and Yvette Liebson
briefly revisited the so-called “expand[ed]” use of unilateral contract
theory that Pettit identified some twenty years prior. Focused on the
historical rise and fall of the unilateral contract framework, they express
skepticism about the utility of the concept in any contractual context
outside the reward paradigm.163 In employment and elsewhere, they urge
courts to ask the underlying question—whether there is or ought to be a
legal obligation, an issue on which they profess agnosticism.164 Notably,
however, they decline to answer that questions themselves.
In sum, the few scholars who have engaged this subject in the
employment context are mindful, to varying extents, of the lack of fit
between the unilateral contract framework and employment relationships.
Yet they also avoid looking too closely. Nearly all of them express a
willingness to sacrifice doctrine for policy. Epstein and Liebson are more
critical of modern reliance on the unilateral contract framework, but their
chief concern is the integrity of contract formation law. Employment
contracts figure only briefly in their analysis as an example of why the
unilateral framework is often unhelpful within that scheme.165 Thus, no
one has offered a rigorous treatment of the relationship between the
unilateral contract theory and employment. The next section provides that
account.
B. The Unilateral Employment Contract Fallacy
The previous section revealed how general contract law disfavors the
unilateral contract frame. Yet scholars have largely accepted its

162

See infra Section III.C.
Epstein & Libeson, supra note ___, at 270 (asserting that the use of unilateral
contract theory in most modern cases is “obiter dictum,” and that where courts purport to
rely on a distinction between unilateral and bilateral, "there is generally a more sound basis
for the holding.”).
164
Epstein & Libeson, supra note ___, at 302.
165
Epstein, supra note ___, at 306 (concluding that in the employment context “the use
of the phrase "unilateral contract" at best describes a result; it does not cause or even help
reach the result”).
163

DRAFT Arnow-Richman & Verkerke

[xx:2023]

10/12/22 4:55 PM

Deconstructing Employment Contract Law

33

application to employment, considering it a creative or at least innocuous
judicial innovation. We take a very different view.
This section demonstrates how unilateral contract theory has
distorted employment contract doctrine. First, the unilateral contract
framework fails as a descriptive matter. Employees almost always accept
employment through a promise rather than performance. In so doing, they
make—and employers solicit—a meaningful commitment to future
performance, albeit an indefinite one. Second, the unilateral contract
framework presumes a discrete performance. It provides no doctrinal tools
for determining how terms of employment are supplied and modified in
this hyper-relational context. As a consequence, judicial efforts to apply
unilateral contract doctrine ignore these important dimensions of
employment, obscure fundamental policy choices, and severely distort
existing contract doctrine.
1. A “Square Peg in a Round Hole”166
We have seen that the unilateral contract model is both limited and
disfavored. A unilateral contract forms only in situations where, owing to
uncertainty about performance, the offeree makes no return promise, and
it would be unreasonable to infer one.167 Common experience teaches that
few if any employment relationships fit that description.
First, employment relationships almost always begin with a verbal or
written acceptance, that is, a promise not a performance. Typically, the
process begins with an offer by the employer: a company expresses a
desire to hire an applicant for a position at a specified wage or salary. The
degree of detail provided varies, as does the extent of any negotiation that
follows. In some cases, the job offer is extended on a take-it-or-leave it
basis; in others the candidate scrutinizes the details and may counteroffer
on salient terms like pay. Either way, the deal closes with the candidate
eventually indicating, either orally or in writing, that he or she “accepts”
the job, often as not using that precise word. Indeed, it is one of the
relatively few business transactions that follow what contemporary

166
167

Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999) (J. Jones dissenting).
See supra Part II.A.
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contracts theorists concede is a highly stylized model of contract
formation.168
This is not merely a description, but a reflection of employer
preference consistent with the basic law of acceptance. Employers
“require” a promissory acceptance to ensure performance and avoid the
legal risk of extending multiple offers. 169 Were an employer to seek
formation of a unilateral contract—one that could be accepted only by
performance—the company would not know whether the job had been
filled until the candidate actually showed up on the designated start date.
This situation would leave the company uncertain whether to invest time
in considering other applicants. Should more than one candidate “accept,”
whether by promise or performance, the employer could in theory be held
liable to whomever it rejects.170 Thus, requiring a promissory acceptance
allows employers to better manage their workflow and anticipate their
hiring needs.171
Second, the terms of employment are incomplete and develop over
time. A key characteristic of offers for unilateral contracts is that they fully
identify the desired performance, enabling the offeree to simultaneously
accept and render complete performance.172 In contrast, an employee who
accepts a new job will receive further information about the terms of the
relationship and the employer’s performance expectations. This
supplementation of the parties’ agreement begins in the elaborate

168

Shawn J. Bayern, Offer and Acceptance in Modern Contract Law: A Needless
Concept, 103 CAL. L. REV. 67 (2015).
169
170

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 30.

Under the current understanding of employment is at will, the employer is in theory
permitted to terminate without liability even after workers have accepted the job and before
they begin performance. See, e.g., Meerman v. Murco, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 832 (Mich.
App.1994); Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, 761 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. App. 1988);
Bakotich v. Swanson, 957 P.2d 275 (Wash. App. 1998). But several courts have imposed
liability under promissory estoppel in these situations, particularly where the employee
incurs a loss in reliance on the job offer, such as where the employee turns down other
offers. Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (MN 1981). As we will argue,
there is a contractual basis for that liability under the bilateral framework we propose in
Part IV. See infra Part IV.A.
171
Surprisingly some contracts scholars think otherwise. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.15 (3d 2004) (describing handbooks as “situations in
which an offeror has no interest in a bilateral contract” because “a commitment by the
offeree would be of so little value to the offeror that the offeror has no interest in being
bound in return for a promise.”).
172
See supra Part II.A.1.
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onboarding process that many companies undertake with new hires.
During that period, employees receive additional terms of employment,
including what important employer promises (e.g., the precise cost and
coverage of the employer’s benefits plan) and more precise specification
of employee obligations (e.g., the policies and procedures with which the
employee is expected to comply). This information is too extensive and
complex to be presented in the initial offer of employment.173
Such formal onboarding is by no means universal, but it is merely one
illustration of the hyper-relational nature of employment terms. Much of
the information and instruction that are essential to employees’ ability to
perform—including shift assignments, assigned tasks, methods for
completing those tasks, and how their work will be evaluated—are
provided serially, in multiple communications, and evolve over time.174
This feature of employment precludes any possibility of a performancebased acceptance because the employer’s initial offer does not, and indeed
cannot, fully specify what is required to perform.
Third, and relatedly, most employment relationships have no fixed
endpoint. Under the prevailing understanding of employment-at-will,
either party may decide to terminate at any point. As previously discussed,
this aspect of the relationship has led some commentators to describe
at-will employment as non-contractual or illusory.175 Yet employment is
clearly an exchange relationship—a trade of money for labor—with the
consent of both parties. A more accurate description, therefore, is that the
employment relationship is contractual, but indefinite. Long-term
commercial contracts may be structured in an identical way—with parties
committed to continuing performance until one party chooses to

173
See Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___ at 435-36 (“It is impossible to
imagine a contract that sets out all of the terms and expectations of what is likely to be an
evolving and potentially long-term work relationship
174
Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___ at 437 (describing “informal ‘changes’
in employment ‘terms” [such as staffing decisions, work instructions, personnel actions,
etc.]—that parties likely anticipate as part of the natural ebb and flow of a dynamic work
relationship”).
175
See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS Sec. 96 (1960) (describing
employment as described employment at will as “not a contract at all” but rather “an
expression in which the promises are illusory”); FARNSWORTH § 7.20 (“It might be better
to think of at-will employment as involving an “agreement” rather than a “contract).
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terminate—and are plainly treated as such.176 The confusion lies not in
defining the relationship as contractual, but in attempts to shoehorn it into
the unilateral model of contract formation. Some courts and commentators
have sought to circumvent this problem by characterizing each day of
employment as the start of a new unilateral contract. 177 This description,
however, does not accord with the intentions or beliefs of the parties. They
view themselves as continuing an ongoing relationship rather than
contracting anew each workday.178
Finally, even when the employment relationship is terminable at will,
employers often require workers to sign restrictive agreements regarding
such matters as information confidentiality, non-competition, and dispute
resolution. These types of agreements are quite common and exist across
a variety of industries and position. A representative study found that
nearly one in five participants was bound by a noncompete at the time of
response, and nearly forty percent had signed a noncompete at some point
in their career. 179 Other common restrictive agreements may require
employees to protect proprietary information, forgo client and co-worker
relationships, and refrain from disparaging the employer.180
To be sure, employees sometimes have cause to contest the scope of
these agreements and their enforceability. For example, courts will refuse
to compel arbitration if the employer’s procedure is deemed

176

The Uniform Commercial Code contemplates this arrangement in its default terms
for contracts that do not specify a duration. See U.C.C. § 2-309(2) (“Where the contract
provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable
time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by either party.”); see
generally Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming, supra note ___ at 1546 (discussing these
provisions).
177
Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Mich. 1987) (discussing and
critiquing this understanding).
178
Id. (describing this characterization as “strikingly artificial” because “[f]ew
employers and employees begin each day con-templating whether to renew or modify the
employment contract in effect at the close of work on the previous day”).
179
Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force,
64 J.L. & ECON. (2021).
180
See Orly Lobel, Boilerplate Collusion: Clause Aggregation, Antitrust Law &
Contract Governance, 106 MINN. L. REV. 877 (2021) (describing the way in which
employers deploy such agreements in concert, creating an “contract thicket” that overly
constrains worker mobility); Natarajan Balasubramanian, Evan Starr & Shotaro
Yamaguchi, Bundling Postemployment Restrictive Covenants: When, Why, and How It
Matters (2021) (observing the incidence of various restrictive agreements and finding that
noncompetes and non-solicitation and recruitment agreements are usually bundled with
other pro-employer agreements).
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unconscionable181 or enforce an injunction against a competing employee
if the scope of the restraint is unreasonable182 or violates state statutory
restrictions.183 But the parties unquestionably intend these promises to be
contractually binding despite the “at-will” nature of the relationship. Thus,
a fourth and final reason why the unilateral framework is inapt is that
employees in at-will relationships often make explicit and enforceable
return promises notwithstanding the indefinite nature of the position.
These are prospective and intended to survive the termination of the
employment relationship. These commitments contradict any possible
characterization of the relationship as unilateral.
In short, the unilateral contract model is incompatible with the
hyper-relational nature of employment. Employers and employees begin
their relationship with promises. They both expect to be bound by and
benefit from mutual future obligations. Thus, this approach to employment
contracts distorts contract doctrine and misdescribes the reality of
employment relationships.
2. A Doctrinal House of Cards184
The previous section showed how poorly the unilateral contract
framework suits the employment context. This section reveals the fragile
doctrinal edifice courts have built on that fundamentally flawed
foundation. The unilateral reward paradigm requires a discrete promises
that remains fixed throughout the period of performance. But in the
hyper-relational employment contract, the period of performance is

181
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 6 P.3d 669
(Cal. 2000).
182
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) (providing that
a restraint on competition is unenforceable if it “is greater than is needed to protect the
[employer’s] legitimate interest, or…is outweighed by the hardship to the [employee]”).
183
An increasing number of states have passed or amended legislation in recent years
to impose additional restrictions on employers’ use of noncompetes, in particular with lowwage workers. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New Enforcement Regime:
Revisiting the Law of Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles
Sullivan) with 2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1223 (2020) (cataloguing recent
legislative changes).
184
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Asmus v. Pacific Bell and the "Unilateral"
Employment Contract: Building the House of Cards Higher, in The Best and Worst of
Contracts Decisions: An Anthology, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 887 (2017-2018).
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indefinite and the promise is subject to change. 185 Forcing unilateral
contract doctrine onto employment has led courts to awkwardly interject
bilateral principles into their unilateral analysis and to invent novel rules
of so-called unilateral contract modification. The resulting body of law
compounds the errors we have already described and obscures crucial
judicial policy choices.
This is nowhere more apparent than in the law of employee handbook
modification. Before the ink was dry on decisions like Woolley and
Toussaint, questions arose as to whether and how employers might modify
binding personnel documents. As we discuss in more detail in Part III,
employers responded to the enforcement of employee handbook policies
by redrafting provisions that could be read to promise job security or other
benefits. 186 They added language disclaiming the legal significance of
their policies and affirmatively asserting that such materials were
noncontractual.187 To the consternation of employee rights advocates and
scholars, these risk management strategies ultimately proved successful
for employers. Most courts today hold that boilerplate disclaimers
preclude employee claims as a matter of law.188 But these same courts soon
had to decide whether employers should be permitted to modify newly
enforceable job security policies. Could handbook revisions, unilaterally
initiated by the employer, eliminate previously conferred contractual
rights?
Critical and competing stakes underlie this question. An employer’s
written policies are the official word of the company.189 Consequently,
employees have a strong expectation that they will be followed.190 Yet it
would be problematic to bind employers to their current policies for all

185

See Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 116 (“[W]here employment is for an indefinite duration,
the unilateral contract framework provides no answer to the question: When will the act
bargained for by the employer be fully performed?”).
186
See generally Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of Implied Employment
Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345 (2008); Verkerke, Empirical Perspective,
supra note ___; infra Part III.B.
187
Id.
188
See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991); see generally
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Employment as Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447 (2009);
Feinman, supra note ___, at 365-70
189
Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1265 (“As every employee knows, when superiors tell you
“it's company policy,” they mean business.”).
190
Id. (noting that for this reason “it would be almost inevitable for an employee to
regard [the employer’s personnel manual] as a binding commitment”).
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time. Companies need flexibility to fulfill their prospective business plans
and respond to changing product and labor market conditions. They also
cannot, as a practical matter, maintain and administer different policies for
different workers based on their individual hire date. Consequently,
modification of employer policies poses a recurring and fundamental
question about the role of employer discretion and employee expectations
in the private ordering of the workplace.
Yet for the reasons just discussed, unilateral contract doctrine offers
no framework for resolving this important issue. By definition, unilateral
contracts form and are performed simultaneously, thus foreclosing the
possibility of modification during the course of the relationship.191 This
glaring conflict between unilateral theory and real-world contract practice
might have led some judges to abandon the ill-fitting unilateral contract
framework and explicitly recognize the long-term, reciprocal, and
consequently bilateral nature of the employment relationship. However,
courts doubled down on the unilateral characterization and issued a
befuddling series of opinions even more poorly reasoned than their
ancestors.
Two contrasting approaches emerged. 192 The majority approach,
which we refer to as “reasonable notice,” permits employers to modify
their policies merely by notifying the workforce of the prospective
change.193 Asmus v. Pacific Bell is a leading case.194 Pacific Bell initially
adopted a policy promising managers retraining and reassignment in the
event of job elimination.195 It later replaced it with a new policy designed

191
Rather the recurring question with regard to unilateral contracts is, as previously
discussed, whether and when the initial offer may revoked. See supra Part II.A.1. That
question presupposes that a binding acceptance has yet to occur. It is possible, if awkward,
to conceptualize an employer’s modification of an existing policy as an attempted
revocation within the unilateral framework. This would bring to bear the previously
discussed partial performance doctrine adopted in Restatement § 45. However, courts have
given scant attention to that Section. See Demasse v. ITT, 984 P.2d at 1140, 1144, n.3 (AZ
1999). We return to this idea infra.
192
Arguably there is a third approach, illustrated by the Michigan Supreme Court’s
decision in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1987), which rejects
the contractual framework altogether. We will explore the Michigan line of cases in detail
in Part III. For now, what is important is that no jurisdiction adopted the Bankey approach,
and Michigan law ultimately retrenched in favor of a contract analysis. See infra Part III.
193
In earlier work, Arnow-Richman refers to this as the “unilateral modification”
approach. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___at 450.
194
999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000).
195
Id. at 73.
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to decrease managerial staffing through severance and benefit
incentives.196 In a breach of contract suit brought by a group of managers
affected by the change, the California Supreme Court held for the
employer. The court rejected the employees’ claims that the employer had
to obtain their explicit assent and provide fresh consideration to modify
the previous policy.197
In reaching this conclusion, the court reaffirmed the unilateral nature
of the employment contract, ostensibly analyzing the modification
question pursuant to that body of law. According to the court:
The general rule governing the proper termination of unilateral
contracts is that once the promisor determines after a reasonable
time that it will terminate or modify the contract, and provides
employees with reasonable notice of the change, additional
consideration is not required.198
In a highly technical and notably dispassionate analysis, it went on to
dispense with proof of both consideration and assent.199 Instead, the Asmus
opinion re-invoked the legal fiction that these elements of contract
formation could be inferred from employees’ continued employment.200
This analysis is deeply flawed. There is no “general rule” regarding
the “proper termination of unilateral contracts.”201 The court’s assertion is
not only a pure invention, it is contrary to any plausible understanding of
unilateral contract law. If, as the court assumed, Pacific Bell’s original
policy was an “offer” for a unilateral contract and the employees
“accepted” by continuing employment in response to the original
management security policy, then it was too late for the employer to

196

Id.
Id. at 81.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 80.
201
Arnow-Richman has critiqued this aspect of the Asmus decision in detail elsewhere.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Asmus v. Pacific Bell and the "Unilateral" Employment
Contract: Building the House of Cards Higher, in The Best and Worst of Contracts
Decisions: An Anthology, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 887 (2017-2018). We rely on that work
throughout this section.
197
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terminate or modify. The employees had already performed by remaining
on the job, and thus the employer was bound by its promise.202
The closest one could come to applying valid unilateral contract
doctrine in this context would be to invoke the previously discussed partial
performance rule.203 Using the unilateral framework, it is possible, though
awkward, to understand an employer’s modification of an existing policy
as an attempt to revoke the original offer. However, the contemporary
revocation rule contradicts the California Supreme Court’s conclusion.
Under Restatement § 45, once a promisee has begun performance, the
promisor must hold the offer open for a reasonable to time to allow the
promisee to complete the requested performance. 204 This rule would
require Pacific Bell to maintain its layoff policy for long enough to allow
covered employees to receive the full benefit of the continued employment
sought by its promise.205 Of course, the employer never defined that period
of time, but simply encouraged its workforce to stay. These intractable
contradictions show why the court erred by framing the contract as
unilateral in the first place.206
To be clear, our critique here concerns the Asmus court’s reasoning
rather than the court’s policy motivations or the reasonable notice rule
itself. Although unilateral contract analysis offers no insight into this fact
pattern, there are other, more coherent, ways to reach the same outcome.
For example, depending on the scope of the original rights, permitting
policy modification upon reasonable notice might strike a sensible balance
between the employees’ justified expectations and the employers’ need for
flexibility. 207 Alternatively, a reasonable notice standard may reflect

202

See id. at 888; Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note – at 451. (“If the employer’s
original handbook altered the at-will nature of the relationship, then the employer is no
longer in a position to lawfully terminate the employee and rehire on new terms.”)
203
See infra Section II.A.1.
204
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45; supra Part II.A..
205
The Asmus majority makes no mention of Restatement § 45.
206
See Arnow-Richman, House of Cards, supra note ___ at 956 (opining that such
irreconcilable problems with Asmus’ reasoning “bring[] down the curtain on the unilateral
contract charade”).
207
See Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589, 595 (S.C. 1994) (“[T]he employeremployee relationship is not static. Employers must have a mechanism which allows them
to alter the employee handbook to meet the changing needs of both business and
employees.”); cf. Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1155 (J. Jones, dissenting) (suggesting that
permitting modification upon reasonable notice is preferable to “employers [being]
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judicial skepticism about the legitimacy of the employees’ underlying
rights.208 Courts stretched conventional contract doctrine to find handbook
policies enforceable. So, perhaps the resulting rights are less than fully
contractual. 209
Finally, and most importantly for our purpose, a reasonable notice
rule could also be justified under bilateral contract analysis, but only if the
rescinded policy provided something less than unqualified job security.
We have described this possibility elsewhere, and will return to the idea in
Part IV.210 For now, however, we only intend to show how the California
Supreme Court, in deciding Asmus, neither explained its motivations nor
offered a defensible doctrinal basis for its ruling. Instead, the court invoked
a non-existent set of “traditional” unilateral contract modification
principles. Thus, this leading case built the majority rule on a confused
premise, using flawed reasoning and concealing whatever policy
objectives animated the decision.
The minority approach to midterm modification of employee
handbooks is equally problematic. These courts reject the idea that
employers have a legal right to replace enforceable policies after simply
providing reasonable notice. Instead, cases like Demasse v. ITT Corp
purport to apply conventional principles of contract modification.211 In
Demasse, the employer replaced its policy of conducting layoffs in reverse
order of seniority with one that selected employees for layoff based on
their job performance.212 A group of laid-off employees hired under the
original seniority policy subsequently alleged that the employer had no
legal right to modify that enforceable agreement.213 The Arizona Supreme

unilaterally forced by economic circumstance to curtail or shut down an operation,
something employers have the absolute right to do”). This rationale would make the most
sense in situations where the underlying promise was something other than a full-fledged
commitment to job security.
208
See Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___ at 453 (offering this explanation).
For purposes of the litigation, Pacific Bell conceded that the original management retention
policy was enforceable. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 74.
209
See Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 119 (adopting this view); RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 2.05 cmt. b. (endorsing Asmus’ reasonable notice rule by analogy to administrative
rulemaking); infra Part III.B.
210
See Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___, at 481-82; infra Part IV.
211
984 P.2d at 1140 (Ariz. 1999).
212
Id. at 1140.
213
Id.
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Court agreed.214 Like the California court in Asmus, the Demasse court
began by reaffirming that employer policies may become binding as a
unilateral contract.215 Then, the court reasoned that once a contract forms,
regardless of how it arises, general rules of modification apply.216 Thus,
Demasse held that the employer must secure employees’ assent217 to the
new policy and provide “separate” consideration—continued employment
alone would not suffice.218
The Demasse court deserves some praise for recognizing that, once
formed and until its termination, a contract can only be modified by mutual
assent of the parties. In that respect, the court implicitly treats the
plaintiffs’ relationship with their employer as bilateral. These classical
common law principles of contract modification—requiring fresh
consideration and mutual assent—by their nature can only apply to an
executory bilateral agreement. 219 Ironically, however, the dissent
chastised the majority for this very move. 220 According to the dissent,
applying formal modification principles to an at-will employment
relationship is akin to forcing a square peg into a round hole.221 But, as we
have shown, the reality is precisely the opposite. Unilateral contract
doctrine is the square peg in the round hole of employment law—just as it
is in contract law itself.
Unfortunately, however, the court’s implicit step towards the bilateral
model was a missed opportunity to clarify the nature of employment
contracts. The Demasse majority’s reasoning instead sews further
doctrinal confusion. As we have noted, the court reinforced the mistaken
214

Id.
Id.
216
Id. at 1144 (“Once an employment contract is formed—whether the method of
formation was unilateral, bilateral, express, or implied—a party may no longer unilaterally
modify the terms of that relationship.”).
217
Id. at 1145 (“[T]he employee does not manifest consent to an offer modifying an
existing contract without taking affirmative steps, beyond continued performance, to
accept.”).
218
See id. (“[Anything else] brings us to an absurdity: the employer’s threat to breach
its promise of job security provides consideration for its rescission of that promise.”).
219
For a discussion of the classical rules of contract modification, including the
requirement of “new or additional consideration,” see Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra
note ___ at 458-60.
220
Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1153 (J. Jones dissenting) (“[The majority] transforms the
conventional employer-employee contract from one that is unilateral (performance of an
act in exchange for a promise to pay) to one that is bilateral (a promise for a promise)”).
221
Id. at 1156.
215
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idea that unilateral contract doctrine should govern employment contract
formation. But since a unilateral contract is formed and fully performed at
the same moment, that doctrinal framework offers no insight into the
enforceability of a midterm contract modification—the issue the Demasse
court confronted.
Compounding this initial error, the majority invokes formalistic,
outdated principles of contract modification. The court asserts that any
enforceable modification requires not only mutual assent but also fresh
consideration, in this case, from the employer. Without mentioning it by
name, the court applies the preexisting duty rule.222 This highly technical
and comparatively strict rule was the prevailing approach to contract
modification until the middle of the twentieth century. But the rigid
preexisting duty rule fell out of favor with both courts and scholars long
ago. Commentators argued that contracting parties need flexibility to
adjust their relationship in the face of changed circumstances. 223 And
when disputed modifications appeared fair and necessary, courts usually
found ways to circumvent the pre-existing legal duty rule.224
These realist impulses came to full flower with the passage of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which flatly rejects the notion that contract
modifications require any form of consideration to be binding. Under
Article 2, a modification need only meet the general standard of good faith
applicable to all contracts.225 Similarly, common law courts increasingly
made exceptions to the preexisting duty rule. According to the Second

222

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject
of honest dispute is not consideration.”). The aim or the rule was to prevent a coerced
modification—and protect the conceptual integrity of the consideration doctrine—by
ensuring that some reciprocal benefit flowed to whichever party gave up a contractual right
or assumed an increased burden under the new arrangement. See generally 2-7 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (2022), LexisNexis (attributing the PELDR to
“tough cases in which one contracting party has been subjected to a holdup game, so that
the promisor [agreed to the modification] under some degree of economic duress”).
223
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the U.C.C.:
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 (describing
the PELDR as “a roadblock to the free adjustment of contracts”); CORBIN, supra note ___,
at § 7.1 (discussing this position).
224
See Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___, at 459 (discussing how courts
“leverage[ed] legal fictions” to avoid the PELDR when confronted with “seemingly fair”
modifications). Hillman, Policing, supra note ___, at 852 (1979) (describing courts’
resistance to the PELDR).
225
See U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
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Restatement, modifications that are “fair and equitable in view of
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made”
require no additional consideration. 226 Rather than focusing on the
formality of consideration, courts sought to enforce voluntary, mutually
beneficial modifications and refuse enforcement of coerced and
extortionary modifications.227 These more permissive rules reflect broader
developments in contemporary contract law. Thus, the current approach to
contract modification eschews formalistic devices like consideration in
favor of an approach that emphasizes instead the real-life circumstances
of the parties.
In contrast, the Demasse majority hewed closely to the traditional
preexisting duty rule. Rather than asking whether the employer’s proposed
modification was a fair and equitable response to unanticipated
circumstances, the opinion focuses narrowly on the absence of new
consideration. This approach oddly mirrors earlier courts’ insistence that
only employees who provide so-called additional consideration could
escape the employment-at-will super-presumption and enforce employer
promises of job security. 228 Part IV will outline better way to analyze
employer policy modifications using contemporary contract principles.
For now, however, we wish only to highlight how current caselaw
embodies the employment contract exceptionalism that we have been
criticizing.
Decisions expanding or contracting worker protections are equally
laden with technical discussions of formal contract doctrine that offer a
thin veneer of legitimacy. But closer analysis reveals only outdated rules
like the rigid preexisting duty rule or utterly fabricated concepts like
modification of unilateral contracts. Unsurprisingly, these opinions offer
only a sterile treatment of crucial policy questions. Courts’ reasoning
conflicts with mainstream contract law and misrepresents the real-world
experiences of both employers and employees.

226

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
See Robert Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 681 (1982).
228
See, supra, Part I.A.
227
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III. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WITHOUT CONTRACT DOCTRINE?
As we saw in Part II, judges misapply unilateral contract doctrine.
The unilateral framework initially allowed courts to enforce employee
benefit promises without disturbing the powerful presumption that an
indefinite-term employment relationship is terminable at will. It makes
much less sense, however, as a formal doctrinal basis for enforcing
assurances of job security. Employment is, fundamentally, a bilateral
relationship. The doctrine used to enforce these assurances thus should
reflect the mutual exchange of promises at the core of any employment
contract.
Since courts have, so far, utterly failed to develop a coherent formal
doctrinal account of the employment relationship, it is tempting to ask
whether a less formal approach might be preferable. Perhaps judges could
simply abandon the strictures of formal contract doctrine. They might
instead enforce employers’ assurances of job security whenever
compelling public policy reasons support enforcement. And they could use
the same public policy considerations to establish procedures for
employers to modify or rescind those assurances.
As we will explain in this Part, a revolutionary line of cases from
Michigan did precisely that. These decisions candidly acknowledged that
formal doctrine made it difficult to enforce employers’ policy statements
concerning progressive discipline and grounds for termination. They
offered instead an informal public policy approach that protected workers’
“legitimate expectations” of job security. Subsequently, many courts in
other jurisdictions have quoted and cited these Michigan cases in support
of their own decisions that enforced employers’ assurances.
Tellingly, however, none of those courts fully embraced this informal
approach to enforcement. Instead, they resorted to the tortured formal
doctrinal arguments we describe in Part I and Part II. And even Michigan
courts ultimately weakened the “legitimate expectations” branch of its
employment contract jurisprudence. This little-known legal history
teaches us that only with a new formal doctrinal approach can we hope to
untangle the current employment contract chaos. Courts continue to insist
on formal doctrinal reasoning. And thus, we conclude that a more informal
approach based in public policy will not overcome judges’ tendency to use
inapposite doctrines such as unilateral contracts.
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A. Enforcing Employees' Legitimate Expectations
In the first half of the 20th century, Michigan courts, like those in
many other jurisdictions, established a strong presumption that
employment for an indefinite term is terminable at will.229 As a result,
plaintiffs seeking to enforce employers’ assurances of job security had to
give “consideration in addition to the services to be rendered” or prove
“distinguishing features or provisions” sufficient to overcome the at-will
presumption. 230 In practice, this approach ordinarily made employee
handbook promises or other policy statements concerning job security
legally unenforceable.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court departed dramatically from existing doctrine.231 First, the
court signaled far greater willingness to enforce oral assurances of job
security. Although prior decisions often viewed these alleged promises
skeptically, the Toussaint majority adopted a much more sympathetic
perspective towards such claims. The court reviewed two cases
consolidated for appeal. In one case, the plaintiff Ebling testified that,
during the job interview leading to his hiring, he expressed concern about
the possibility that philosophical differences with his prospective
supervisor at Masco Corporation could get him fired. Masco’s Executive
Vice President allegedly told Ebling:
I would personally assure you that if anything comes up between you
and [the supervisor] that is detrimental relative to your performance
that you will be reviewed by myself before anything happens and given
a chance to correct these things, and, if you are doing the job, you can
be assured that you will not be discharged.232

Finding sufficient evidence of an express oral contract allowing
termination only for cause, the court unanimously upheld the jury’s
$300,000 verdict for breach of that employment contract.233

229
Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315 (Mich. 1937) (“Contracts for permanent
employment or for life have been construed by the courts on many occasions. In general,
it may be said that in the absence of distinguishing features or provisions or a consideration
in addition to the services to be rendered, such contracts are indefinite hirings, terminable
at the will of either party.”) See generally Section I.A.1 supra.
230
Id. at 316-17.
231
292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
232
Id. at 898.
233
The four judges joining the majority opinion construed the contract as requiring
good cause, Id. at 896, while three concurring judges found a so-called “satisfaction
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In the other case, the plaintiff Toussaint similarly testified that Blue
Cross representatives offered oral assurances of job security during his
preemployment interviews:
Mr. Schaedel had indicated to me that as long as I did my job, that I
would be with the company [until mandatory retirement at age 65];
showed me a number of documents—I had asked the question about
how secure a job it was and he said that if I came to Blue Cross, I
wouldn’t have to look for another job because he knew of no one ever
being discharged.234

The court majority found these statements sufficient evidence to sustain
the jury’s verdict for Toussaint. They reasoned that, like Ebling, Toussaint
inquired about job security when he was hired. A reasonable juror thus
could interpret the assurance that he would be with the company “as long
as I did my job” as agreement to a “contract of employment terminable
only for cause.” 235 However, three dissenters disagreed that such a
statement was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict for Toussaint. Instead,
they distinguished Ebling on the ground that, in that case, “the parties
negotiated over, and agreed to, certain qualifications concerning
[termination].” 236 As we will soon see, the dissenters’ reservations
foreshadowed a later shift in Michigan towards a comparatively restrictive
approach to the enforceability of oral assurances of job security.237
The court’s far more significant innovation, however, came in
response to Toussaint’s allegation that written company policies also
committed Blue Cross to terminate his employment only for cause. In
response to Toussaint’s inquiries about job security, hiring officials
handed him the Blue Cross “Supervisory Manual—Personnel Policies and
Procedures.”238 The section on “Terminations” provided:

contract” prohibiting termination only for a reason that is “insincere, in bad faith, dishonest
or fraudulently claimed as a subterfuge.” Id. at 902 (quoting Isabel v. Anderson Carriage
Co.).
234
Id. at 904.
235
Id. at 884.
236
Id. at 904 n.4.
237
See infra Section I.C.3.
238
Id. at 903. He also received a pamphlet entitled “Guidelines for Michigan Blue
Cross Employees” that summarized company policies using simple language and
“caricature-like drawings on nearly every page as an aid to understanding the text.” Id. at
905.
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It is the policy of the company to treat employees leaving Blue Cross
in a fair and consistent manner and to release employees for just cause
only.239

The Manual also established a detailed “Disciplinary Procedure,” which
stated that:
a series of progressive, corrective measures will be applied. [Before
imposing any disciplinary measures,] the employee should be
counselled about (1) what the standard of performance or behavior is,
(2) how he or she is not meeting that standard, (3) what he or she should
do to correct the performance or behavior, and (4) what action the
supervisor will take if the performance or behavior is not corrected.240

And finally, according to the Manual, “discipline will be given only for
cause.”241
The Toussaint majority held that these written policy statements
became part of Toussaint’s employment contract because he had
“legitimate expectations” that Blue Cross would provide progressive
discipline and discharge him only for just cause. The court reasoned first
that companies adopt such policies to attract more productive employees
and to improve workplace morale.
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices,
where an employer chooses to … and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The
employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the
employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the
conviction that he will be treated fairly.242

If employers derive such an obvious benefit from making assurances of
job security, then justice demands that employees should be able to
enforce such promises. The opinion also alluded to the risk of
“misunderstandings” about the terms of employment.243 An employer like
Blue Cross could avoid misleading employees by “requiring prospective
employees to acknowledge that they served at the will or the pleasure of
the company.” 244 The Toussaint majority thus identified two distinct
public policies—benefits to employers and the risk of employee

239

Id. at 911.
Id. at 909-10.
241
Id. at 909.
242
Id. at 892.
243
Id. at 891.
244
Id. at 891.
240
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Although, as we saw in Section II.B, many courts have misapplied
unilateral contract doctrine to enforce handbook promises, the court
forcefully disclaimed the importance of contract formalities.
No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties’
minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the
employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer’s policies
and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to
create an environment in which the employee believes that, whatever
the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at
any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and
uniformly to each employee. The employer has then created a situation
“instinct with an obligation.”245

The Toussaint majority thus embraced what we can justly describe as an
informal public policy approach to enforcement. The court identified
persuasive policy reasons to enforce any handbook assurances that could
lead reasonable employees to believe they have job security. But rather
than torturing contract doctrine into submission, the court candidly
admitted that those public policy concerns—rather than conventional
doctrinal principles—compelled their decision to enforce.
B. Portents of a More Restrictive Approach
The court’s ruling in Toussaint protected employees’ “legitimate
expectations” of job security. But it also upended Michigan employers’
expectation that a strong at-will presumption would protect them from
most potential employment contract claims. 246 The case held that
unqualified employer statements establishing procedures for progressive
discipline or requiring just cause for termination would be legally
enforceable. The court also rejected conventional contract defenses and
instead based enforcement on broad notions of public policy. As a result,
employers found themselves desperate for a strategy to ward off such
claims and restore their preferred at-will relationship with employees.

245

Id. at 892 (citing inter alia Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(1917)); see J.H. Verkerke, Story of Woolley, supra note ___ (observing that Toussaint
“swept aside all formal doctrinal barriers” to handbook enforcement in favor of a standard
based on employee expectations).
246
See Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315 (Mich. 1937).
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In response to the decision, management-side employment attorneys
predictably counseled their clients to update their employee handbooks
and policy statements.247 These employment lawyers promptly drafted an
evolving array of exculpatory statements and practices designed to negate
any employee expectations of job security. Over the ensuing decade,
employee handbooks and hiring documents incorporated progressively
more restrictive language to prevent workers from suing for breach of an
employment contract.
The earliest clauses simply recited that the handbook did not create
any contractual rights and specifically disclaimed any intention to
guarantee employment for a definite time. Soon, however, companies
began to include an affirmative confirmation of at-will status—stating that
both the employee and the employer remain free to terminate the
employment at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all. Later
iterations of these protective amendments commonly added both a merger
clause—to guard against prior or contemporaneous oral agreements—and
a clause barring enforcement of any modification unless it was
communicated in writing and signed by a designated corporate officer.
Employers also needed proof that workers had agreed to these exculpatory
terms. In response, they eventually developed the now-standard practice
of requiring employees to sign a separate document that acknowledges
receipt of the employee handbook and reinforces the disclaimers contained
elsewhere in the employer’s policies.248
Of course, courts in Michigan and other jurisdictions had expressly
invited this employer response.249 In their decisions enforcing assurances
of job security, they repeatedly observed that employers could avoid
enforcement. All that was required, they said, was to include language that
clearly disclaimed any intention to provide contractual protection against
discharge. 250 A mere contract formality could override employees’
contrary expectations. Thus, even in Michigan, we see that the formal
contract language trumps employee expectations.
The widespread introduction of these exculpatory clauses into
employee handbooks also soon forced courts to decide how such clauses

247

See Verkerke, Empirical Perspective, supra note 42, at 842.
See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and Policy Statements:
From Gratuities to Contracts and Back Again 21 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 307
(2017).
249
See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258, 1271 (1983).
250
Id.
248
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affected previously established contractual rights. This issue finally
reached the Michigan Supreme Court in In re Certified Question (Bankey
v. Storer Broadcasting).251 As framed by the Sixth Circuit, the certified
question assumed that a requirement of good cause for termination had
become legally enforceable under the rule of Toussaint “as a result of an
employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in the employer’s written
policy statements.”252 The question then asked whether an employer may
unilaterally modify an incumbent employee’s for-cause contract to permit
termination at will even if the employer’s original policy failed to reserve
the right to modify.
The Bankey court held that such a policy change is permissible so
long as the employer “gives affected employees reasonable notice of the
policy change.”253 More colorfully, the court opined that “a discharge-forcause policy announced with flourishes and fanfare at noonday should not
be revoked by a pennywhistle trill at midnight.” 254 An employer must
choose a method of notification that alerts all affected employees of any
change and gives them a reasonable opportunity to understand the new
policy. In addition to this requirement of reasonable notice, the court
insisted that its rule would preclude changes “made in bad faith—for
example, the temporary suspension of a discharge-for-cause policy to
facilitate the firing of a particular employee in contravention of that
policy.” 255 The Bankey standard thus permits only bona fide policy
changes applicable to the entire workforce or to some recognized subgroup
of employees and prohibits changes that single out any individual
employee the employer may wish to discharge. Finally, the court clarified
that no policy change can deprive employees of already accrued or vested
employee benefits.256

251
443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989). The case was argued in March 1987 but not decided
until June 1989.
252
Id. at 113.
253
Id. at 113.
254
Id. at 120.
255
Id. at 120.
256
Id. at 121 n.17. This aspect of the decision resembles the current focus of good faith
protections on situations involving already-earned compensation. See, e.g., Fortune v.
National Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
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Although the lead opinion garnered unanimous support, 257 its
reasoning revealed several doctrinal fault lines that ultimately derailed the
potentially expansive “legitimate expectations” theory. First, Bankey
remains one of very few judicial opinions to recognize that most
employment contracts are fundamentally ambiguous about the duration of
any commitments they contain. Of course, many courts and commentators
speak of “indefinite term” just-cause contracts.258 And modern cases such
as Pugh, Toussaint, and Woolley embrace the idea that an employer’s
assurances of job security are legally enforceable even though the duration
of that promise is unspecified.259 But these cases ordinarily fail to consider
how long the parties intended the job security promise to remain in effect.
This formal doctrinal indeterminacy often masks a more fundamental
policy choice that every court must make in analyzing employers’
assurances. It is helpful to envision judicial motivations for enforcing these
commitments arrayed along a continuum. At one extreme, imagine a judge
trying to protect workers who take a job and remain loyal to their employer
for many years precisely because those workers have relied on the
employer’s policy statements concerning job security. In these
circumstances, unilateral policy changes unsettle worker expectations and
deprive them of the long-term protection that was an essential part of their
initial employment contract. We can call this concern a desire to protect
“long-term reliance.” At the opposite end of the continuum, imagine a
judge concerned only that workers should know what contract terms
currently govern their employment. On this understanding, each day is a
new contract under the terms currently in effect. This approach focuses

257

Although Justice Levin, who wrote the majority opinion in Toussaint, filed a
separate opinion in Bankey, he too expressed “substantial agreement with the conclusion
and views stated in the majority opinion.” Id. at 121. Justice Levin’s opinion also offered
a somewhat cryptic suggestion that employees who have served under a discharge-forcause policy may be entitled to “some other relief or remedy” beyond reasonable notice.
Id. at 122 n.3. But he devoted five of seven pages to explaining his doubts about whether
the court had subject matter jurisdiction to respond to certified questions from a federal
court. Justice Boyle joined the Bankey majority but wrote a short concurring opinion solely
to emphasize her view that “the pure legitimate expectations leg of Toussaint was founded
on the Court’s common-law authority to recognize the enforceability of obligations that
were not contractual.” Id. at 121 (emphasis added) Thus, Justice Griffin’s majority opinion
effectively spoke for a unanimous court.
258
See, e.g., Smoot v. Boise Cascade Corp., 942 F.2d 1408, 1410-11 (1991).
259
See Pugh v. Sees Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329-30 (1981); Toussaint, 292
N.W.2d 880, 890-91; Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1985).
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solely on preventing misunderstanding, and thus it protects only extremely
“short-term reliance” on any assurances of job security.
Although the “reasonable notice” approach adopted in Bankey falls
somewhere between these extremes, it lies far closer to the “short-term”
than the “long-term” end of the spectrum. Under Bankey, employers have
no contractual obligation to maintain protective policies. And employees
have no right to rely on the continuation of those polices throughout their
careers. As a result, some courts and commentators have condemned such
limited protection on the ground that it allows employers to deceive
workers with legally unenforceable illusory promises.260
The Bankey court, however, rejected this criticism. They noted that
the rule of Toussaint holds employers accountable by requiring the
personnel policies “’in force at any given time’” to be “‘applied
consistently and uniformly to each employee.’”261 Even so, the everyday
understanding of a “policy” envisions “a flexible framework for
operational guidance, not a perpetually binding contractual obligation.”262
Thus, the court saw no reason to prevent employers from unilaterally
amending their policy statements. Moreover, Toussaint stressed the value
of maintaining uniform personnel policies for all employees. A rule
requiring individual renegotiation to modify a policy would risk either
imposing on the entire workplace whatever policies existed when the
longest tenured employee was hired or forcing employers to honor a
multiplicity of outmoded policies for any employees who reject a policy
amendment.
In contrast, employee advocates understood Toussaint to protect
workers who justifiably expect employers to live up to the promises
implied by their written policy statements concerning job security. In the
court’s memorable invocation of a well-known phrase, employers’
assurances create “a situation ‘instinct with an obligation.’”263 It takes just
a small step from that understanding to infer that the court might wish to
protect employees’ long-term reliance on those assurances. As we have
just seen, however, Bankey unequivocally quashed those hopes. Instead,

260

See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1147-48 (1999).
Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
262
Id. at 120.
263
Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon).
261
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the decision firmly aligned Michigan with the majority of jurisdictions that
offer only short-term protection during a reasonable notice period.264
But the Bankey decision also sought to weaken the legal rationale for
protecting legitimate expectations at all. According to the court employer
policies are “not enforceable because they have been ‘offered and
accepted’ as a unilateral contract” but only because they benefit
employers. 265 When an employer announces a new policy of at-will
employment, this benefit “is correspondingly extinguished, as is the
rationale for the court’s enforcement of the discharge-for-cause policy.”266
More broadly, the court’s opinion took pains to distinguish the legitimate
expectations prong of Toussaint from more traditional doctrinal paths to
enforcing employer policies. They noted that “[u]nder circumstances
where ‘contractual rights’ have arisen outside of the operation of normal
contract principles the application of strict rules of contractual
modification may not be appropriate.” 267 Although she endorsed the
court’s answer to the certified question, Justice Boyle’s five-sentence-long
concurrence exuded a thinly veiled contempt for the earlier decision and
took pains to distance herself from the “pure legitimate expectations leg
of Toussaint.” She opened the door to reexamine in the future whether the
court’s use of its “common-law authority to recognize the enforceability”
of these non-contractual obligations was ill advised.268 We see in these
passages a battle over whether Toussaint’s principal innovation is
doctrinally legitimate.
In Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan,269 decided the same day
as Bankey, Justice Griffin—the author of the Bankey majority opinion—
and Justice Boyle exchanged roles. The case involved a commissioned
salesperson who alleged that his employer promised at hiring that “nobody
gets fired unless they steal.” His complaint also included much more vague
references to “reasonable expectations” based on unidentified “policy
statements” of the employer.270 Justice Boyle’s majority opinion cleverly
deflected attention from the legitimate expectations analysis that she

264
See Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000). See generally Arnow-Richman,
Reasonable Notice.
265
Id. at 119. Cue everyone’s favorite “instinct with an obligation” quote from
Toussaint.
266
Id. at 119.
267
Id. at 116.
268
See infra our discussion of Justice Boyle’s concurring opinion in Rowe.
269
444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989).
270
Id. at 117.
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clearly disfavored. Instead, she emphasized a procedural peculiarity and
rested the court’s ruling on far more conventional grounds for enforcing
the employer’s express oral assurances. 271 Justice Griffin, on the other
hand, wrote an impassioned dissent that bemoaned the pernicious effects
of Toussaint and called for the court to impose new limits on “what has
come to be known as the Toussaint doctrine.”272
The opinion complained that the “general rule”—that indefinite-term
employment relationships are terminable at will—was “in danger of being
swallowed up by the ‘narrow exception’ announced … in Toussaint.”273
Concerning “legitimate expectations” analysis, the dissent said “it cannot
be denied that Toussaint pushed heavily against and through the
boundaries of employment contract law.” 274 According to the opinion,
“[w]hen mutual assent is replaced by the ‘expectations’ of one party as the
measure of contract viability, an invitation to litigate is heralded, loud and
clear. 275 Justice Griffin would stem the tide of litigation principally by
taking a more skeptical view of express oral assurances of job security.276
Although other courts have wisely “distinguished between ‘puffery and
promise,’”277 he expressed skepticism about “a breach of contract action
based solely on an alleged oral representation recalled with remarkable
specificity long years after the time of hiring.”278 Thus, he concluded the
court or the legislature should limit the ability of plaintiffs to enforce these

271

The case involved denial of a motion for summary judgment that the employer filed
even before answering Bullock’s complaint. At such an early stage of the litigation, Justice
Boyle was able to focus attention on an alleged oral agreement and conclude that the
employer’s written policy was at best “an [unaccepted] offer to modify the discharge-forcause provision of Bullock’s alleged express contract.” Id. at 119.
272
Id. at 133.
273
Id. at 132.
274
Id. (quoting “instinct with an obligation” language).
275
Id. at 133.
276
More specifically, he called for courts and legislatures to reconsider decisions that
exempt from the normal Statute of Frauds writing requirement those oral promises that are
“capable of performance within one year.” Id. at 136-38 (emphasis added).
277
Id. at 133 (quoting Carpenter).
278
Id. at 134. Justice Griffin also would have held that by continuing his employment
after receiving notice of new employer policies Bullock consented to those modified terms
of employment. (“Surely, where an employee continues to work under a revised
compensation system for nearly four years, as in the case at bar, acceptance by the
employee should be implied [sic] as a matter of law.”)
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oral promises. As we will see, a majority of the court would soon share
Justice Griffin’s skepticism.279
C. The Resurgence of Formalism
The gathering clouds of opposition to Toussaint burst with a torrent
of critical analysis and contrary conclusions in Rowe v. Montgomery
Ward.280 The court reviewed and reversed an $86,500 jury award to Mary
Rowe, a highly successful commissioned salesperson for Wards. At hiring,
she was told “she would have a job at [Wards] as long as she achieved her
sales quota,” and trial testimony from the company employee who hired
her corroborated that specific statement.281 Rowe also signed a sheet of
“Rules of Personal Conduct” that enumerated other permissible grounds
for termination. More than five years later, in 1982 and 1983, Wards issued
a series of revised handbooks that included a “Sign-Off Sheet” confirming
employees’ at-will status and expressly reserving the right to change the
conditions of employment. Despite repeated requests from the company’s
personnel office, Rowe refused to sign this sheet.282 Two years later, Rowe
was observed leaving work during a scheduled shift. Although the court’s
lead opinion offered an unflattering portrayal that suggested Rowe was
irresponsible to leave work and insubordinate when asked to explain her
absence, the dissent described additional evidence that cast her conduct in
a far more sympathetic light.283 Nevertheless, the store manager decided
to fire her.
The lead opinion, speaking for three justices, 284 began candidly
enough with what reads as a stinging repudiation of Toussaint. Echoing

279

See infra text accompanying notes ___-___ (discussing Rowe v. Montgomery

Ward).
280

473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
Id. at 294-95 (Justice Levin dissenting).
282
She objected that it was directed at new employees and inconsistent with her terms
and conditions of employment. Wards personnel administrators ultimately settled for a
signature on the back of the sign-off sheet over a handwritten statement that she “[r]ead
and do not wish to sign.” Id. at 293 n.19.
283
Rowe was an outstanding salesperson who routinely garnered awards for leading
the store in sales. She was covering a shift for another Wards employee and alerted a coemployee that she had to attend to some personal business. Although she failed to clock
out when she left, her hours worked played no role in determining her compensation as a
commissioned salesperson. She also testified that the department was adequately covered
in her absence. Id. at 291 n.13.
284
Justice Boyle concurred separately but expressed agreement with all three of the
main parts of Justice Riley’s lead opinion. Justice Mallett was recused, and Justices Levin
and Cavanagh dissented. Thus, the final vote was 4-2 for reversal.
281
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the Bullock dissent, the opinion condemned the informal “legitimate
expectations” approach as lawless:
[In Toussaint,] this Court joined the forefront of a nationwide
experiment in which, under varying theories, courts extended job
security to nonunionized employees. In the vast outpouring of ensuing
cases, there are indeed situations in which employers have in reality
agreed to limit managerial discretion. However, the theory remains
troubling because of those instances in which application of contract
law is a transparent invitation to the factfinder to decide not what the
“contract” was, but what “fairness” requires…. But unless the theory
has some relation to reality, calling something a contract that is in no
sense a contract cannot advance respect for the law. Thus, we seek a
resolution which is consistent with contract law relative to the
employment setting while minimizing the possibility of abuse by either
party to the employment relationship.285

In what followed, the lead opinion and a concurrence developed arguments
both for limiting the legitimate expectations prong of Toussaint and for
curtailing the enforcement of express oral promises.
Concerning legitimate expectations, Justice Riley continued a
rhetorical battle begun in Bankey and Bullock. According to his lead
opinion, those cases distinguished between “a promise implied in law
arising from the employer’s creation of legitimate expectations” and “an
oral contract … formed on the basis of an express promise of job security
or a promise implied in fact.”286 Similarly, Justice Boyle’s concurrence
noted that “the [employer’s] Rules of Personal Conduct also may be
analyzed under the policy prong of Toussaint to determine whether it gives
rise to legitimate expectations, an obligation implied in law.”287 We also
should recall Justice Griffin’s concurrence in Bullock where he gave vent
to his frustration that Toussaint “pushed … through the boundaries of
employment contract law.”288 Justices Riley, Griffin, and Boyle all appear
to use the “non-contractual” label as part of a concerted strategy to
delegitimize the “legitimate expectations” branch of the Toussaint
holding.
When the lead opinion finally turned its attention to Wards’ personnel
policies, it concluded:
[The] 1983 manual clearly and unambiguously notified plaintiff of the
company’s termination-at-will policy. We are persuaded therefore that

285

Id. at 269.
Id. at 272 n.4 (emphasis added).
287
Id. at 285 n.8 (emphasis added).
288
Bullock at 132.
286
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the 1983 manual would have succeeded in modifying any prior
expectations of termination only for cause… The last handbook
distributed to plaintiff was sent out at least nine months before her
discharge. Therefore, as a matter of law, we find that the existence of
three handbooks clearly providing for termination at will … constituted
reasonable notice of defendant’s policy.289

Although framed simply as an application of the rule of Bankey, this
analysis made a notable leap beyond the principle of that case. The
certified question in Bankey addressed only employer policy statements
that had become enforceable under the legitimate expectations branch of
Toussaint. The lead opinion in Rowe also deployed unilateral modification
as a tool against Rowe’s allegation that the Rules of Personal Conduct
created a contract to terminate only for cause. But rather than assessing as
a matter of fact whether subsequent handbooks were sufficient to
overcome any reasonable expectations Rowe may have had about her
employment, it decided this issue as a matter of law. Surely, Toussaint
would have required more. Thus, the lead opinion’s approach confirmed
what the court’s treatment of the comparatively abstract certified question
in Bankey had hinted. The new court majority was determined to rein in
what most justices saw as the excesses of Toussaint.
Moving on from these efforts to domesticate legitimate expectations,
Justice Riley and Justice Boyle also rejected Rowe’s claim that she had an
express oral contract with Wards. Tellingly, their analysis reintroduced a
version of the at-will super-presumption that we described in Section I.A.
Relying on the venerable Lynas decision, the opinion saw no
“distinguishing features or provisions” or “special circumstances” that
might limit the employer’s right to discharge Rowe.290 Without evidence
of additional consideration or some comparable validation device, the lead
opinion concluded that the historically strong at-will presumption should
prevail. Justice Riley also expressed profound skepticism about oral
promises of job security—or what his opinion somewhat disparagingly
called promises of “permanent employment.” 291 Echoing the Bullock
dissent’s reference to the Statute of Frauds, 292 he emphasized “the
difficulty [of] verifying oral promises.”293 Finally, Justice Riley asserted
that Rowe’s contract claim must fail because of “omitted term[s]” and

289

Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
Id. at 272 (quoting Lynas).
291
Id. at 272.
292
See supra Section III.B, text at notes ___-____.
293
Id. at 273.
290
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indefiniteness. Thus, we see in the Rowe decision a resurgence of precisely
the sort of hostile and formalistic reasoning that previously barred all but
a very few employment contract claims.294
We have seen that Michigan courts ultimately defanged Toussaint’s
legitimate expectations theory. Although judges in other jurisdictions have
often quoted and cited the decision approvingly, none have embraced the
case’s informal public policy theory of enforcement. For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, recognized
a new contract claim based on handbook assurances of job security.295 The
court repeatedly quoted long passages from Toussaint and relied heavily
on that court’s reasoning.296 But rather than endorsing an informal theory
based on legitimate expectations, the court instead offered not one but
three formal doctrinal theories of the case—including both unilateral
contracts and promissory estoppel. 297 Other courts similarly drew
inspiration from Toussaint but recoiled from its most novel innovation.
Instead, decisions liberalized enforcement of employer assurances while
hewing closely to familiar formal doctrinal categories. And thus, Michigan
remained an outlier. Perhaps Toussaint’s legitimate expectations analysis
would have been a more transparent and coherent basis for enforcing
assurances of job security. But, even as the case accumulated favorable
citations, the theory never gained a foothold. Courts instead insisted on
forcing formal doctrinal rules to yield their desired outcome.
IV. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL AS A BILATERAL CONTRACT
In Part III, we explored an informal approach that uses public policy
rather than formal doctrinal principles to enforce employer assurances of
job security. Although this alternative theory would sidestep doctrinal
problems that afflict the unilateral contract framework, it has failed to
attract judicial support. Courts instead insist on resolving employment
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In a subsequent decision, Rood v. General Dynamics, 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich.
1993), the court rejected an alleged oral promise but allowed the plaintiff to proceed with
a legitimate expectations claim based on the employer’s written policies. However, the
reasoning of Rood confirms that the court has curtailed the expansiveness of Toussaint and
brought Michigan back into line with centrist jurisdictions.
295
491 A.2d 1257, 1266-68 (N.J. 1985).
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Id. at 1263, 1268 & n.10.
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See id. at 1266-68.
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contract disputes by appealing to formal contract doctrine. If so, they ought
to do a better job of it.
This Part shows how. We sketch a new conceptual framework for
employment-at-will relationships built on contemporary contract
principles. We understand employment as a bilateral contract of indefinite
duration.298 Both parties retain the right to terminate this relationship, and
the employer has discretion to set future terms. But the employer and
employee may only exercise these powers subject to the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing that applies to all contracts. We outline the
basic features of this model and show how it reframes the at-will
termination privilege and the recurring challenges of open terms,
indefiniteness, and modification. Our bilateral approach increases
transparency and gives courts new insight into the employment
relationships they are regulating.
A. Understanding At-Will Employment as a Contract
We begin with the question of whether an employment-at-will
relationship is a contract at all. In Part II, we characterized employment as
a hyper-relational setting. 299 Thus, workers and firms anticipate an
engagement for an indefinite period, subject to termination by either party,
governed by a broad array of written and oral policies, and giving the
employer broad discretion to introduce new terms and modify existing
ones. These features of employment have long troubled courts committed
to classical contract theory. Under traditional doctrinal principles, an
agreement terminable at will lacks consideration because the parties’
promises would, as a result, be illusory.300 Similarly, their promises often
would be too indefinite to warrant legal enforcement because they omit
key terms or specify those terms imprecisely.301
Our critique of existing law has shown how courts have historically
responded to these doctrinal problems. When evaluating oral assurances
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Arnow-Richman has explored this idea in earlier work, which we draw on
throughout this part. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note ___ at 480-81;
Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming, supra note ___ at 1565-68.
299
See supra text accompanying notes ___-___.
300
See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 96 (1960).
301
See Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (1916); supra Part I.A.
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of job security, promises of deferred benefits, or the enforceability of
handbook policies, judges customarily ask whether that specific promise
formed a contract.302 Rather than viewing employer statements as part of
an ongoing contractual relationship, cases currently struggle to determine
whether one isolated part of that ongoing interaction should be legally
enforceable. 303 This fragmented analysis betrays a distorted judicial
understanding of employment. Notably, this approach also presumes that
the broader employment relationship is non-contractual.
Contemporary contract principles prescribe quite a different analysis.
Starting in the mid-20th century, reform-minded critics of classical contract
law inspired courts to reexamine traditional doctrinal obstacles to
enforcing incomplete and indefinite agreements.304 Most jurisdictions have
since relaxed formerly stringent rules of contract formation and
interpretation and invigorated the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a
constraint on contractually conferred discretion. Thus, promissory
indefiniteness far less often bars enforcement because these judges now
treat the parties’ intent to be bound as the primary indicator of a contractual
commitment.305 In addition, courts more readily admit contextual evidence
both to interpret and to supplement written agreements. Default rules fill
open terms, and a more permissive parol evidence rule significantly lowers
barriers to enforcing oral promises.306 Finally, the duty of good faith and
fair dealing has become a robust constraint on the exercise of contractually
conferred discretion.307
These doctrinal innovations reflect the jurisprudential influence of the
Realist Movement and find full expression in provisions of the UCC and
the Second Restatement. Examples abound showing how these
developments have transformed commercial and business contract
practice. First, courts now readily enforce output and requirements
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See supra Section I.B.
Id.
304
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960 (1992); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code 1940-1949, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 275 (1988).
305
See, e.g., UCC § 2-204; Hodgkins v. New England Telephone, 82 F.3d 1226, 1231
(1st Cir. 1996).
306
See, e.g., Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564-567 (Cal. 1958).
307
See, e.g., Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. App. 1986).
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contracts for the purchase or sell an indefinite quantity of goods. Parties to
these contracts may demand (or supply) only a quantity required (or
produced) in good faith. 308 Similarly, courts have held that exclusive
dealing contracts impose on the grantee of exclusive rights an implied duty
to use best efforts to promote the good or service.309 Countless decisions
also confirm that oral agreements, established practice, and industry norms
play an increasingly important role in determining contractual terms and
the meaning of those terms. 310 And, in at least some cases, even the
discretionary power to terminate an agreement may only be exercised in a
manner consistent with good faith.311
Such dramatic changes invite us to reconsider employment contract
law. As we have seen, contemporary contract doctrine ordinarily enforces
commercial agreements whenever parties intend to be bound, even if key
terms of the deal, such as the duration of the relationship and the terms of
exit, remain indefinite.312 It also tolerates the allocation of considerable
discretion to one of the contracting parties. 313 Using a variety of
interpretive tools—including both contextual evidence and the implied
duty of good faith—courts plug gaps and check contractually reserved
discretion to find an enforceable agreement consistent with the parties’
intentions.
These more permissive rules imply that existing employment contract
doctrine is woefully out of date. Modern understandings of contract
formation and interpretation can comfortably accommodate the
hyper-relational features of employment relationships. Indeed, those
characteristics make employment uniquely well suited for a less rigid
approach. Commercial parties are usually sophisticated repeat players and
often represented by counsel. 314 In contrast, workers are comparatively
unsophisticated, make few employment contracts in their lifetime, and
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See UCC § 2-306(1).
See UCC § 2-306(2).
310
See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil, 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981); Columbia
Nitrogen v. Royster, 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
311
See, e.g., Carrico, 490 N.E.2d at 976; Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 150 F.2d 642, 644–45 (2d Cir. 1945).
312
See supra note ___.
313
See, e.g., Amoco Oil v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1993).
314
See Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New
Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 501-19 (2010).
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rarely enjoy legal representation during the negotiation or the performance
of those contracts. 315 Thus, courts that have liberalized commercial
contract law should be even more willing to apply those same principles
in the employment context. And courts that have resisted those changes
should be willing to consider them here.
B. Toward a Bilateral Model of Employment Contracts
Our discussion in Part III showed that courts remain strongly wedded
to formal doctrinal reasoning. They have shown no appetite for an
informal approach grounded in public policy. And, as we noted earlier,
legislative reform efforts have made no significant headway despite
decades of academic advocacy. 316 Thus, in this section, we offer a
preliminary vision of a formal approach that replaces antiquated reasoning
with contemporary contract principles and terminology. We conclude by
describing some implications of our approach and identifying areas for
further research.
1. Contract Duration and Termination Rights
As we have seen, the super-presumption led some courts to treat
at-will employment relationships as noncontractual. These courts found
that a contract exists only if an employer’s written or oral assurances of
job security are sufficiently definite and specific to justify enforcement.317
From the perspective of contemporary contract law, however, this
approach makes no sense. The at-will rule, no matter how strong the
presumption, is nothing more than a termination provision. It is merely a
single term of the parties’ contract that will apply only when (if ever) one
of them chooses to exit the relationship. However, a wide array of other
terms and conditions govern the parties’ day-to-day performance of their
contractual obligations. By ignoring these provisions to consider only
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See Verkerke, Legal Ignorance, supra note 7.
See supra note ___.
317
See Verkerke, Empirical Perspective. Although we focus here on job security terms,
courts may also find a binding restrictive covenant or agreement to arbitrate. But current
caselaw similarly analyzes these clauses in isolation from the rest of the employment
relationship. Thus, the fragmented approach we describe in Parts I & II treats all
employment contract claims as separate questions of contract formation rather than as
elaborations or modifications of an ongoing contractual relationship.
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termination, courts distort the issue of contract formation and narrow the
scope of any resulting obligations.
Contemporary contract law instead focuses our attention on the
exchange relationship. An employment-at-will contract, like any
employment contract, is a voluntary exchange of money for labor. For that
reason, it is necessarily contractual. Both parties manifest a commitment
in the form of mutual promises—the employer to provide employment and
pay for services rendered and the employee to serve.318 At its outset, the
duration of the parties’ commitment is unspecified. But from a
contemporary perspective, this fact means only that the term of the
contract is indefinite. In the world of commercial contracts, there is
nothing problematic or even unusual about such an arrangement. Under
the UCC, for example, when parties do not specify a duration, their
contract continues for a “reasonable time” and may be terminated at-will
upon “reasonable” notice. 319 Common law cases similarly hold that a
service contract exists despite its indefinite duration or even an express
at-will termination provision.320
We contend that courts should reconsider these issues with fresh eyes,
abandoning the employment law exceptionalism that has so distorted their
analysis for many years. The principles we propose here imply that every
employment engagement forms a contract. That contract forms when the
parties make a definite manifestation of their intent to create a working
relationship. Although we expect that most courts would still presume that
such a contract is terminable at will, they should likewise impose the
meaningful constraints of reasonable duration and reasonable notice for
termination. These terms both fill gaps when the contract is silent and
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See supra Part II (contrasting the hyper-relational employment relationship with the
unilateral reward paradigm).
319
See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-309. To somewhat similar effect, common law
courts have found implied duties that arise from the nature of the parties’ relationship and
that even supply the mutual promise required to establish an enforceable bargain. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
320
See, e.g., Carrico, 490 N.E.2d at 976; Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 150 F.2d 642, 644–45 (2d Cir. 1945).
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implement a modern understanding of good faith in contractual relations
that confer wide discretion on one party.321
The full implications of requiring reasonable duration and reasonable
notice of termination are beyond the scope of this Article.322 Our point here
is that these concepts clarify issues obscured by decades of employment
contract exceptionalism. For example, the question of whether continued
at-will employment constitutes consideration for a return promise has
provoked considerable controversy. 323 But if at-will employment must
persist for a reasonable duration and during a reasonable notice period,
then it is also sufficient to support enforcement of any reciprocal promise.
Those same requirements also provide new support for what is currently a
minority view concerning the rights of new employees who have been
hired and then terminated before reporting to work.324 Among jurisdictions
that have considered this issue, most have held that an at-will termination
provision absolutely precludes such an employee’s contract claim.325 But
if the parties have formed a bilateral contract through an offer and
acceptance, then the employee should be entitled to compensation for a
reasonable duration of employment and a reasonable notice period.
2. Open Terms, Conferred Discretion, and Modification
Of course, employment duration is not the only indefinite aspect of
an at-will relationship. Many other terms remain open at hiring. For
example, new hires are often unaware of the precise scope and content of
their employer’s benefit plans and workplace rules. Both parties also
expect that the employer will assign work and issue daily instructions that
the employee must follow. The full terms of the relationship are simply
too complex and variable to specify comprehensively in advance. Instead,
321
As we have already described, well-counseled firms routinely include in their
employment documents an express confirmation that both parties may terminate the
agreement at will. We anticipate that they would respond to a reasonable notice
requirement by attempting to disclaim that limitation. Although analyzing such disclaimers
is beyond the scope of this Article, the doctrinal principles we advocate also include
constraints on exculpatory language and remedies for contractual overreaching.
322
One of us has explored the implications of reasonable notice elsewhere. See
Arnow-Richman, Reasonable Notice.
323
See, e.g., Camco v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832 (Nev. 1997).
324
See Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
325
See Petitte v. DSL.net, Conn. Ct. App. No. AC27557 (July 10, 2007); Sartin v.
Mazur, 375 S.E.2d 741 (Va. 1989); Slate v. Saxon, 999 P.2d 1152 (Or. App. 2000), review
denied, 6 P.3d 1105 (Or. 2000).
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both parties understand that these details will be supplied incrementally,
primarily by the employer. In other words, the at-will employment
contract is highly “incomplete.” 326 Its terms are not found in a single
integrated writing. Instead, they must be culled from a variety of sources—
written, oral, and implied.
This multiplicity of sources, however, does not change the fact that
they comprise a single agreement. As we have seen, courts have isolated
an individual term of employment and asked incorrectly whether that term
alone could constitute an offer that might ripen into a binding contract.327
But contemporary contract law rejects this approach. It requires courts to
harmonize and reconcile the available evidence of the parties’ intent.328
This more modern framework would transform the analysis in most
employment contract cases. Rather than pursuing a largely fictitious
inquiry into contract formation, courts should engage in a more fruitful
quest for a harmonious interpretation of the parties’ undeniable contract.
This approach also would cast doubt on the widespread practice of treating
employers’ exculpatory boilerplate disclaimers as conclusive proof of the
parties’ intent. To the extent that such a disclaimer contradicts the
employer’s consistent practice and oral assurances or deprives employees
of the benefit of their bargain, a court might construe it narrowly or
disregard it altogether.329
Yet another important feature of the hyper-relational employment
contract is that the employer has broad discretion to supply many of its
terms, and most of those terms are subject to change. That reality,
however, does not determine their contractual status, nor does it
undermine the legitimacy of the overall agreement.330 It merely suggests
326
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). There is a rich literature
addressing why such gaps exist and how courts should fill them. See, e.g., id; Omri BenShahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 389. For present purposes what is important is merely that these “gaps” do
not diminish the binding nature of the parties’ agreement. We engage this literature in a
forthcoming paper that explores the implications of the bilateral model we propose here.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Reconstructing Employment Contract Law
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
327
See, e.g., Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Pwr., 143 A.2d 762 (N.J. Super. 1958) (deferred
benefits); Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257 (handbook terms); see generally supra Parts I & II.
328
See, e.g., Byme v. Ivy, 241 S.W.3d 229, 236-40 (Ark. 2006).
329
See, e.g., Helle v. Landmark, 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (Ohio App. 1984).
330
Although detailed analysis of arbitration clauses is beyond the scope of this Article,
several decisions have held that employer discretion to modify or terminate arbitration
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that the parties’ contract includes wide areas of contractually conferred
discretion. And that discretion aligns with the real-life experiences and
expectations of workers. Employees anticipate that the employer will
assign and adjust their work duties, establish and modify workplace rules
and procedures, and update leave policies and employee benefits—guided
by organizational needs and business judgment.
Under contemporary contract law, a party may only exercise
contractually conferred discretion consistently with a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.331 Good faith places modest, but legally significant, limits
on the exercise of contractual rights. Under an output (or requirements)
contract, for example, one party has the right to determine the quantity for
sale (or purchase). But that quantity must be reasonable in relation to their
needs or capabilities. And a party may not select a quantity with the
intention of harming the other party’s business or undermining their
interest in the contract.332 Good faith should also constrain an employer’s
reserved discretion to modify handbook policies. Just as this duty imposes
a requirement of reasonable notice for termination decisions, so it should
require similar notice when altering an enforceable term of the
employment relationship.333
CONCLUSION
As scholars of both employment law and contract law, we have long
been frustrated by the disjunction between our two fields of study.
Teaching employment law students about employment contracts always
requires us to begin with an apology. These cases will not make any sense
if you paid attention in your 1L Contracts class, we say. And although
scholars periodically bemoan the disordered state of employment contract
doctrine, they focus mostly on advocating for legislative reform rather than

procedures renders this “contract” illusory. See, e.g., Cheek v. United Healthcare, 835 A.2d
656, 661-64 (Md. 2003). A contemporary approach to these cases might still find the
reserved discretion unconscionable and thus unenforceable, but it surely would not view a
promise to arbitrate as illusory. The implied constraints we discuss in the text ordinarily
would ensure that such a commitment was sufficiently binding to satisfy the minimal
requirements of consideration doctrine.
331
See 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed. 2022).
332
See 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:12 (4th ed. 2022).
333
Note that, in this respect at least, the current majority rule of reasonable notice for
modification conforms with the strictures of good faith. See Asmus, 999 P.2d 71; Bankey,
443 N.W.2d 112. It would be a salutary result to base that rule on a firmer foundation than
the fictitious right to modify a unilateral contract.
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the role of private ordering. Our goal is to inspire both courts and scholars
to reconsider how the tools of contemporary contract law could transform
current thinking about employment relationships.
In this Article, we deconstruct employment contract law. What we
term employment law exceptionalism began inauspiciously with the
powerful employment-at-will super-presumption and resulting doctrinal
absurdities, such as requiring additional consideration or symmetrical
obligations. Courts chose unilateral contract theory to enforce employer
promises of deferred benefits precisely because that approach did nothing
to disrupt the underlying at-will presumption. When some courts decided
that employers’ assurances of job security also should be enforceable, they
uncritically adopted the same unilateral framework.
As we have demonstrated, this doctrinal choice has prevented courts
from developing a coherent employment contract jurisprudence.
Employment is a far deeper and richer hyper-relational setting that
confounds the simplistic reward paradigm of unilateral contracts. To force
this round peg into the square hole of unilateral theory, courts deploy
nonsensical legal fictions and erroneous doctrinal reasoning. Their
fragmented analysis of isolated terms obscures important policy choices
and reinforces employment law’s undesirable divergence from
mainstream contract principles. And a creative judicial effort to develop
an informal alternative based on legitimate expectations has attracted no
adherents. Instead, courts insistently offer dubious formal doctrinal
justifications for their rulings. Thus, the current mess will persist until
courts have a better formal doctrinal framework for analyzing employment
contracts.
Unlike the antiquated doctrine that currently dominates employment
contract jurisprudence, contemporary contract law can comfortably
accommodate the hyper-relational nature of employment agreements. We
have sketched a model anchored in the Realist revolution that transformed
contract law beginning in the mid-20th century and that continues to
develop today. Employment is a single, bilateral contract of indefinite
duration, in which both parties retain the right to terminate at-will and
understand that the employer has discretion to establish and modify future
terms. However, the parties may only exercise these powers subject to the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that applies to all contracts.
Moreover, the terms of the employment contract are found not in a single
integrated writing but require a court to find a harmonious interpretation
of a variety of sources—written, oral, and implied. This approach
fundamentally reframes the at-will termination privilege and the recurring
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challenges of open terms, indefiniteness, and modification. Our
contemporary bilateral approach increases transparency and gives courts
new insight into the employment relationships they are regulating.
Mapping the precise contours of a duty of good faith and developing
rules for interpreting employment contracts are beyond the scope of this
Article. 334 To fully elaborate such a doctrinal framework will require
careful attention to the fact that, unlike most commercial contracts,
employment is a hierarchical relationship. Managers must be able to make
day-to-day decisions without consulting counsel. Many minor policies and
decisions surely should be governed by informal relational norms rather
than legally enforceable contractual obligations. Indeed, courts adopted
the at-will super-presumption principally to protect employers from
lawsuits that they feared would unduly constrain firms’ discretion to
manage the workplace.335 Thus, any recognition of new contract claims
must be carefully targeted and easy to administer. At the same time,
however, courts should recognize that workers’ comparative lack of legal
sophistication further undermines the already shaky case for rigid
enforcement of exculpatory boilerplate.336
In this Article we have laid the groundwork for answering such0
questions. The doctrinal nonsense we document in Part I and Part II
currently obscures all these crucial issues. Reframing employment-at-will
as a bilateral contract will clear away the confused wreckage of current
law and finally give courts a firm doctrinal framework for understanding
the employment relationship. At the very least, if courts insist on using
formal contract doctrine to resolve employment contract disputes, we hope
they will abandon antiquated, ill-fitting rules and instead embrace
contemporary contract theory and doctrine.
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We are currently hard at work on a companion paper that develops and defends such
an alternative framework. See Rachel Arnow-Richman & J.H. Verkerke, Reconstructing
Employment Contract Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
335
See Magnum v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 784-87 (Conn. 1984).
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Cf. UCC § 2-316 (restricting exclusion or modification of warranties).

